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Abstract 
Muhammad Wasiqur R. Khan 
 
ESSAYS ON TARIFF FORMATION 
 
In an era of enhanced trade liberalization the study of tariff policy and 
formation assumes increasing importance. This dissertation explores tariffs under 
three different contexts. 
First, we examine the effect of technology on the choice of external tariffs by 
trading nations. The literature on tariffs usually assumes that trading partners are 
symmetric in key fundamental parameters such as factor endowments, technology, 
preferences, policy and institutional frameworks. This is done in the interest of 
tractability given the complexity of the problems addressed. There thus exists scope 
for research on the impact of inter-country differences in fundamentals on policy 
preferences. We examine the relationship between a key asymmetry, namely 
technology, and tariff selection in a dual general equilibrium model along the lines of 
Dixit and Norman (1980). We find that it is possible to rank tariffs by comparing the 
compensated price elasticity of the import demand function. An expression for this 
elasticity in terms of a technological shift parameter is found and tariffs ranked under 
various specifications of the parameter. An empirical exercise using a cross-sectional 
sample of 42 countries finds some evidence of an inverse relationship between 
technology and tariffs. 
 vi
Second, we study reciprocal trade liberalization in a two country setting that 
allows for asymmetry in country size. The analysis draws on Furusawa (1999) 
wherein it is suggested that as long as status-quo tariffs are invariant during the 
negotiation process, the country with the higher status-quo tariff rate benefits more 
from the negotiation and vice-versa. We formalize this insight by explicitly 
introducing country size and asymmetric status-quo tariffs in a Rubinstein-type 
bargaining model. Our findings indicate that a large country will gain more from 
tariff negotiations regardless of the patience exhibited by the smaller country during 
the bargaining process. 
Third, we use two new measures of openness, namely the Trade 
Restrictiveness Index and the Mercantile Trade Restrictiveness Index (Anderson and 
Neary, 1996, 2003) to empirically examine the relationship between a country’s size 
and outward orientation. We find that the negative relationship between country size 
and openness reported in the literature holds when these two measures are employed. 
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Tariff Preferences and Technology 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine the relationship between technology and tariff selection in a dual 
general equilibrium model, along the lines of Dixit and Norman (1980). We find that 
it is possible to rank tariffs by comparing the compensated price elasticity of the 
import demand function. We find an expression for this elasticity in terms of a 
technological shift parameter and rank tariffs under various specifications of the 
parameter. An empirical exercise finds some evidence of an inverse relationship 
between certain measures of technology and tariffs.  
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1 Introduction 
The theoretical literature on tariff formation and evolutionary tariff games1 
often features the a-priori supposition that trading partners are symmetric in terms of 
key fundamental parameters such as factor endowments, technology, preferences, 
policy issues and institutional frameworks. The adoption of this strategy is 
understandable on grounds of tractability given the complex nature of the problems 
addressed. Nonetheless, it is an immutable fact that in the real world trade occurs 
between partners which have dissimilarities in the aforesaid parameters and that 
these dissimilarities affect trade policy in non-trivial ways. Thus, there exists a broad 
scope for research on the nature of the impact of inter-country differences in 
fundamentals on policy preferences. This paper is an attempt to analyze the effect of 
a key fundamental, namely technology, on the choice of external tariffs by trading 
nations. 
A fairly extensive literature in the area of technology policy exists. Broadly 
speaking, the literature encompasses two different strands – one examines the impact 
of technology on endogenous growth while the other looks at technology within the 
framework of strategic trade policy. While the relevance of the latter to our present 
effort is clear and provides the motivational impetus for the subsequent analysis, the 
former has important bearings too. In the interests of providing a fuller introduction 
to our main topic we will enumerate some of the more germane insights from 
endogenous growth theory first. 
                                                 
1 Please see, for example, Bac and Raff (1997) 
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Pioneering work by Grossman and Helpman (1991) and by Rivera-Batiz and 
Romer (1991 a, b) have focused on the link between international trade integration 
and the associated changes of sectoral specialization patterns on one hand and 
prospects for long-run growth on the other2. The essence of their conclusions is as 
follows: international trade patterns in high-technology markets are determined by 
comparative advantage. The sources of these advantages are often the result of 
countries’ investment in research and development (R&D), i.e., investment in 
knowledge creation. If the knowledge thus created is global, i.e., if the degree of 
(technological) knowledge spillover is universal so that competitors in all countries 
have access to the common knowledge pool, there will be no effects on trade 
patterns. In such circumstances, national technology policy makes little sense 
because any new knowledge that it engenders will diffuse outside the country 
without giving domestic producers any meaningful and persistent advantage over 
foreign competitors. 
If, on the other hand, knowledge spillovers remain geographically 
concentrated and thus essentially national in scope, a cumulative process of 
‘national’ learning might set in and lead to the establishment of a competitive wedge 
between the respective national industry and the rest of the world. In these 
circumstances, a national technology policy might be justified on virtuous grounds. 
The modern theories of endogenous growth recommend public support of R&D 
instead of protectionist measures such as production subsidies or external tariffs. 
These measures are advocated not to minimize static allocative losses but to avoid 
                                                 
2 Please see the excellent survey in “Conflict and Cooperation in National Competition for High-
Technology Industry”, National Academy Press, Washington , D.C. 1996 
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resource competition for skilled labor that may be used in both manufacturing and 
research. For example, production subsidies or tariff protection of high-tech 
production may induce highly qualified scientific personnel to migrate from research 
into production thereby increasing the cost of R&D and reducing the country’s 
growth potential. 
The pioneering work on strategic trade theory can be attributed to Brander 
and Spencer (1983, 1985) and Dixit and Kyle (1985). Their research has focused on 
the international rivalry for monopoly rents in world markets that operate under 
conditions of highly imperfect competition, usually involving only a few producers 
from different countries. A fairly straightforward case for government intervention in 
the form of so-called strategic trade policy is made. By means of subsidies or tariff 
protection to ‘newcomers’ the government may turn potential competitors into actual 
ones, breaking up the (quasi) monopolistic market position of the dominant foreign 
producer(s) and shifting at least some of the monopoly rents from one country to 
another. If the gain in rent exceeds the subsidy costs or losses caused by the tariff 
wedge, the policy stance pays off from a national point of view. 
Williamson (2003) examines tariff policy from a historical perspective. By 
examining a set of world tariff facts for 150 years between 1789 and 1938 he finds 
that tariff policy was driven essentially by revenue considerations and strategic tariff 
behavior. He noted that the Stolper-Samuelson explanation for tariff formation – the 
granting of protection to scarce factors at the expense of abundant factors – 
satisfactorily explained tariff policy prior to the 20th century, while the well known 
infant industry argument assumed a prominent role in tariff setting thereafter. In 
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addition, considerations of geography, home market size, world economic 
environment, trading partner behavior, tariff autonomy and “gunboat” diplomacy all 
played their part as well. 
The literature mentioned above, while greatly illuminating, by and large 
treats policy instruments such as tariffs and subsidies as exogenously determined. 
Governments identify areas of economic activity that are deemed to be beneficial or 
crucial for positive long-term economic performance and grant support accordingly. 
Absent from the literature seems to be any examination of the dependence of policy 
instruments on the nature of technology per-se. This is puzzling given that 
technology evolves over time and has a natural bearing on GDP. Any consideration 
of trade policy ought to take this into account. Furthermore, a natural corollary of the 
infant industry argument mentioned above is that when such industries “grow up” 
i.e. are deemed to be able to survive on a competitive footing, their tariff protections 
should either cease or diminish. Given that technological evolution (and technology 
could be ‘home-grown’ or imported) could lead to such an outcome the idea of a link 
between technology and tariff policy is a conceptually sound one. Yet scarce 
literature on this aspect exists. 
Claro3 does, in fact, consider a putative link between labor-saving 
technological change and changes in tariff structure and rise in international wage 
differences in a dual sector model4. However, he fails to arrive at any definitive 
conclusion regarding the link within the framework of his model.  
                                                 
3 Sebastian Claro, “Tariffs, Technology and Global Integration”, unpublished mimeo, Universidad 
Catolica de Chile 
4 A model with a capital intensive sector and a labor intensive sector. 
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Another strand of literature examines tariff delegation decisions within 
customs unions. Lipsey (1970) argued that the common external tariff adopted by 
customs unions should be chosen to maximize the joint welfare of union members 
provided intra-union transfers are feasible. In the absence of such feasibility, each 
member of the union should be allowed to set an external policy to maximize its own 
welfare (Riezmann, 1985). In a notable contribution by Gatsios and Karp (1995) it is 
demonstrated that it might be in a union member’s best interest to actually delegate 
authority to set external policy to another member (usually the biggest). Following 
on, Syropoulos (2002a) examines tariff preferences in customs unions based upon a 
Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) approach. Within the context of a general neo-classical trade 
model, he first shows that for any two customs union members trading with the rest 
of the world (ROW), the least aggressive member5 is the country with the largest 
compensated price elasticity of import demand. The HO model is then used to 
characterize the dependence of this elasticity on relative factor endowments and 
technology.  
Our approach would be similar. First we will set up a general equilibrium 
trade model incorporating technology in the revenue function in order to obtain some 
comparative static results. This will be followed by refinements wherein the 
parameter of interest is characterized using specific functional forms. Unlike Claro, 
we are able to establish a connection between technology and tariff levels. 
We also carry out an empirical exercise to examine the relationship between 
tariffs and technology. We expect that an inverse relationship between the two 
                                                 
5 Aggression, in this context, refers to the propensity of a trading partner to deviate from a common 
external tariff.  
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should exist i.e. the higher the “level’ of technology, the lower the corresponding 
tariff rates. Evidence supporting this hypothesis is found.  
The basic framework of the neo-classical trade model along with comparative 
static analysis is presented in Section 2. Section 3 presents refinements and 
discussions, the empirical exercise is presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2 General Framework 
In order to examine how technology affects tariff formation we adopt the 
basic model of Syropoulos and incorporate a technological “shift” parameter in the 
revenue function along the lines of Dixit and Norman. To this end we assume a 
world of two countries of equal size, labeled 1 and 2, that produce, consume and 
trade two final goods (also labeled 1 and 2) using an inelastically supplied vector of 
factor inputs vi. Consumer tastes are identical and homothetic, all markets are 
competitive, there are constant returns to scale and no domestic distortions. For 
concreteness we simply assume that country i has a comparative disadvantage in 
good i and thus imports good i. Let ri(pi,θi,vi) and ei(pi,ui) denote country i’s revenue 
(GDP) and expenditure functions, respectively. Here, pi is the domestic relative price 
of country i’s importable measured in terms of its exportable, θi is a shift parameter 
capturing technology (which can take the form of a factor intensity ratio for 
example) and ui is the average welfare in country i. Let τi be country i’s ad-valorem 
import tariff and let world or external prices be denoted by πi (π1=1/π2) 6. The 
                                                 
6 Indeed, under our assumed trade patterns 21
2
2
21
2
1
1
1 /,/ pppppp == where subscripts index 
goods, thus 21 /1 ππ = . 
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assumption of equal size implies that per-capita endowments in the two countries are 
the same which allows us to suppress the vector of factor inputs from the revenue 
(GDP) functions. For future use, we let iu
i
pu
ii
D eep /=α represent country i’s 
expenditure share on its importable and ip
i
pp
ii
D eep /=η  the absolute value of its 
compensated (i.e. holding utility and factor endowments constant) price elasticity of 
demand for the importable good. We can define the fraction of GDP contributed by 
the import competing industry and the price elasticity of supply for the same product 
as iip
ii
S rrp θθα /= and ipippiiS rrp /=η respectively. 
We can now formulate a tariff distorted equilibrium described by the 
following set of equations: 
 
iiip πτ )1( +=     i = 1, 2                 (1) 
 
iiiiiiiii mprupe πτθ += ),(),(  i = 1, 2                 (2) 
 
i
p
i
p
i rem −=     i = 1, 2                 (3) 
 
jii mm =π     i ≠ j = 1, 2                (4) 
 
The equations in (1) relate internal and external relative prices. Those in (2) 
represent budget constraints – a country’s average expenditure is equal to its average 
revenue (GDP) plus per-capita tariff revenues. The equations in (3) describe each 
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country’s average import demand function. The set of equations in (4) represent the 
balanced budget and market clearing conditions (by Walras’ law one of the equations 
in (4) is redundant). In order to ensure the existence of a competitive equilibrium we 
rule out non-convex isoquants and transformation frontiers as well as increasing 
returns to scale. In other words, the set of all technologically feasible input-output 
vectors are convex. Additionally, each consumer has preferences with convex 
indifference curves. We further assume that the revenue function is fully 
differentiable – a crucial assumption as it guarantees uniqueness of the trade price 
and utility levels. Non-differentiability may arise if there are more goods than factors 
and we assume away this pathology.  
The set of equations described above forms the basis of a great deal of 
analysis in international trade theory. The theoretical formulation of the system is 
fully discussed in Dixit and Norman (1980). As has already been mentioned, a 
version of it is used by Syropolous (2002a) in his study of tariff preferences in 
customs unions, he also uses another version of it in examining optimum tariffs, 
retaliation and country size (2002b). The model is thus “flexible” in the sense that it 
can be amended to analyze different trade issues.  
Turning to the model we note the following: 
Clearly, ( , )i i i im m π τ= , total differentiation yields 
i i
i i i i idm m d m dπ τπ τ= +                                                                                                (5) 
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We can define the direct (uncompensated) price elasticity of import demand 
as 
i i
i
i i
m
m
πε π
∂≡ − ∂ , rewrite (5) as 
i i i i i i
i i i
i i i i i i
m m m ddm d m
m m
π τ τππ π τ τ
∂ ∂= ⋅ ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅∂ ∂  and 
divide throughout by mi to obtain 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆi i i i im ε π β τ= − −                                                                                                        (6) 
where we define
i i
i
i i
m
m
τβ τ
∂≡ − ∂ , and a hat (^) over a variable denotes percentage 
change. Equation (6) simply tells us that (ceteris paribus) country i’s import volume 
is inversely related to its tariff or the world price. Total differentiation of (4) yields 
 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
j i i i i
j
i i i
i
i j i
dm dm m d
dmd m
m
m m
π π
π π
π
= +
= −
= −
            i ≠ j = 1,2                                                                     (7)               
Utilizing (6) in (7) we get 
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( 1)
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ( 1)
ˆ ˆ ˆ
i j j j j i i i i
j
i i j j j i i
i
i i j j j i i
i j
i i j
π ε π β τ ε π β τ
ππ ε ε β τ β τπ
π ε ε β τ β τ
β βπ τ τ
= − − + +
− − − = − +
− + − = − +
= − +Δ Δ
       i ≠ j = 1,2                                                     (8)     
 
where 1 0i jε εΔ ≡ + − >  must be fulfilled for (8) to hold, but this is just the general 
Marshal – Lerner condition for market stability. This condition together with the 
assumptions mentioned above, together guarantee the existence of a unique and 
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stable equilibrium. Equation (8) tells us that an increase in a country’s import tariff 
causes its terms of trade to improve and the terms of trade of its partner to 
deteriorate. 
Since we have assumed identical and homothetic tastes, we may write the 
expenditure function ),( iii upe as )()( ii upe φ , 0'>φ for country i. With ordinal 
preferences we can assume ii uu =)('φ . This allows us to define country i’s per-capita 
expenditure function in units of its exportable as eiui where ei ≡ e(pi). Similarly 
defining the revenue function, the average import demand function can be written as 
ii
p
ii
p
i ruem θ−= . Furthermore, these assumptions allow us to rewrite iDα  and iSα as 
ii
p
i eep / and iip
i rrp / , respectively. Taking these modifications into account enable us 
to obtain the following expressions for mi and ui from equations (1) – (3). 
 
)1(
)(
i
D
ii
ii
S
i
D
i
i
Tp
rm α
θαα
−
−=              i = 1, 2                 (9) 
 
)1(
)1(
i
D
ii
ii
S
ii
i
Te
Tr
u α
θα
−
−=              i = 1, 2               (10) 
where )1,0[
1
∈+= i
i
iT τ
τ   
It is notable that a country’s per capita imports and utility can both be 
affected by technology. More pertinently, equation (9) lays out the condition for 
country i to import good i. Since iD
iT α−1  > 0, as long as r and p remain finite, 
importation will take place if iiS
i
D θαα >  i.e. country i’s expenditure share on good i 
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exceeds industry i’s GDP share. Turning to equation (10), we see that the condition  
0 < iiS
iT θα−1 < 1 will ensure diversification in production. 
In order to investigate the effect of endogenous variables on welfare we 
derive several comparative static results from the above system. In what follows 
some superscripts have been omitted to avoid clutter and as usual a hat (^) over a 
variable denotes percentage change (i.e. xdxx /ˆ = ). 
Totally differentiating (2) and using (1) and (3) we obtain: 
 
iiiiiiiii
u drmmdue θτππ θ++−= )ˆˆ(                 (11) 
 
The first two terms inside parenthesis are terms of trade and volume of trade 
effects, respectively. The last term represents the marginal contribution of 
technology. It is not surprising that this contribution is positive7. 
Totally differentiating (3) we obtain: 
 
ii
i
i
p
i
iii
ii
u
u
i
i
pu
i
iii
i
i
p
i
p
i
pp
ii
pp
i
i dr
r
rp
m
due
e
ep
m
p
re
rpep
m θπτπτ θθ
θ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
+−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
++⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−=
)1(
1
)1(
1ˆˆ     (12) 
 
                                                 
7 Actually, it is possible to conceive of a situation when the net contribution of technology to overall 
welfare might be negative. Technology may improve outputs in the export sector so much so that the 
terms of trade deteriorate. This is of course the classic case of immiserizing growth. While the 
literature on this topic is scant, Sawada (2003) provides empirical evidence of the existence of 
immiserizing growth in 28 countries between 1950 and 1988. Hamada and Itawa (1984) report how 
large increases in the price of oil can result in immiserizing growth and describe a situation where the 
gains from an improvement of production technology is outweighed by the loss from deteriorating 
terms of trade. Indeed, this is an actual instance of immiserizing growth induced by technological 
change. 
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Defining )/()( ip
i
p
i
pp
i
pp
ii rerep −−−≡η as the compensated price elasticity of 
the import demand function, utilizing (11) in (12) and rearranging terms we obtain 
 
iii
D
i
i
S
i
D
ii
i
i
D
i
ii
D
i
D
i
ii
i
mpT
dr
TT
pm
)1(
)(ˆ
1
)1/(
1
ˆˆ α
ααθπα
τα
α
η θ
−
−+−
+−−−=               (13) 
 
With little loss of generality we can substitute (9) for mi in (13) in order to 
get: 
i
i
i
ii
S
i
D
i
S
i
Di
i
D
i
ii
D
i
D
i
ii
i d
r
r
TT
pm
i θθαα
ααπα
τα
α
η θ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−
+−−−= ˆ1
)1/(
1
ˆˆ              (14) 
 
The first term on the right hand side of (14) shows the production and 
substitution effects of an increase in price which is negative overall. The second term 
on the right hand side can be construed as an income effect. A fall in the world price 
will cause the volume of imports to increase as a consequence of the normality of 
demand. The third term captures the effect of technology on imports. We recall that 
θ is a shift parameter which captures the state of technology. To examine its 
relationship with imports we must specify the precise nature of the technology. A 
technological evolution may result in altered levels of domestic production of goods 
1 and 2 with commensurate effects on imports. Of course, the precise effect on net 
imports will depend on the elasticity of import demand. 
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Substituting (14) in (11) and simplifying the resulting expression we obtain: 
 
ii
i
ij
ii
S
i
D
i
S
i
Diiii
i
D
i
j
ii
u drr
mp
T
mdue ii θτθαα
αατηπα θ⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡ +⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−+−−−= 1]ˆˆ[1                         (15) 
 
A closer examination of (15) enables us to see that the choice of import tariff 
by a trading partner is conditioned upon the compensated price elasticity of import 
demand. More specifically, the relationship is an inverse one: the larger the price 
elasticity of import demand, the lower the tariff. This is seen as follows: 
Let us suppose that there is an increase in the import tariff. This improves the 
terms of trade which means that the internal price of a country’s importable good 
rises (i.e. there is an increase in p). We note that the volume of trade effect given by 
the second term inside square brackets is negative and increasing with ηi, thus 
country i would have to lower its best response tariff in order to counter-act the 
negative effect. Indeed, Syropoulos (2002a) formally demonstrates a similar result 
for Common External Tariffs within the context of a Customs Union.  
When two trading partners are considered, we have the following 
relationship. 
 
0
)(*
>
<
=
=∂
∂
ji
i
iu
ττττ
 as ji ηη <>=  ji ≠∀                                                                         (16) 
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where τ*(τ j) represents the best response tariff of country i.  Thus, for instance, if    
η1 < η2, then, by (16) 
)(*
11
21/ ττττ =∂∂u < 0 which implies that country 1 would prefer 
its best response tariff to exceed country 2’s best response tariff in order to enjoy 
positive welfare, hence, τ1 > τ2  (or, equivalently, τ* (τ2) > τ* (τ1)). 
A closer look also reveals the following relationship between a country’s 
marginal welfare and its expenditure share on its importable and the fraction of its 
GDP contributed by the import-competing sector. 
 
0>
<=∂
∂
i
iu
τ   as  
ii
S
i
D θαα
<
>=                   (17) 
  
This is clear when we use (10) to obtain the following expression 
 
2))]1(1([
)(
i
D
ii
ii
S
i
D
ii
i
i
e
reu
ατ
θαα
τ −+
−=∂
∂                  (18)
  
Given that (9) lays down the condition for imports to occur (namely, iiS
i
D θαα >  ), 
such a relationship is not at all surprising. 
Having shown that best response tariffs of trading partners can be ranked by 
comparing the compensated price elasticity of import demand, we can then go on to 
examine the dependence of this elasticity upon fundamentals. The goal of this paper 
is to examine the effect of technology upon tariff preferences, so the first step 
towards this goal is to establish an expression for the compensated elasticity of 
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import demand in terms of the fundamental parameter of interest. Defining ηi as 
ii pm ˆ/ˆ  we find 
 
⎥⎥⎦
⎤
⎢⎢⎣
⎡
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−++−+=
i
i
i
ii
S
i
D
i
S
i
Di
i
ii
D
ii
i d
r
r
p
i θθαα
ααλτ
πα
λη
θ
1
ˆ
)1(ˆ
1               (19) 
 
where λi = 1 – T iαiD (> 0) 
It is notable that should iS
i
D αα = , the expression inside first brackets becomes 
indeterminate if θi =1; the expression also becomes indeterminate when θi = i
S
i
D
α
α  . In 
the first instance, therefore, we have to confine ourselves to cases where country i 
does not spend its entire contribution to GDP from the import competing industry on 
its importables. Furthermore, θi cannot be negative, and while it can be zero, the case 
where there is no contribution from technology is not interesting.  This means that 
we are restricted to cases where θi > 0 provided i
S
i
Di
α
αθ ≠ . With these restrictions in 
mind, in our parameter space investigation, we will examine cases where 
10,1 <<= ii θθ  and θi >1. 
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3 Parameter Space Investigation 
The shift parameter is, as we recall, an indicator of the intensity of factor 
usage. Changes in θi, therefore, can be interpreted as changes in technology. 
Following Dixit and Norman (1980) we specify the precise nature of the 
technological change by looking at three specific cases, namely product augmenting 
technical change, technology that results in product specific factor augmentation and 
general factor augmentation. For convenience, when dealing with production 
functions we drop country indices (superscripts now identifying commodities).  
 
3.1 Equal Factor Proportions 
Case 1: θi = 1 (equal factor proportions), iS
i
D αα ≠  
 When θi = 1 expression (15) becomes  
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expanding the numerator of the terms inside the square brackets we get 
iii
D
i
D
iiii rTdr i παατθθ ˆ]1)[1( −−+ , this tells us that ηi is negative or positive 
depending upon whether the first term of the expansion is greater than the second 
term or not.  
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The next step is to obtain expressions for iirθ which we do so following Dixit 
and Norman. 
 
3.1.1 Product Augmenting Technological Change 
The first case we will consider pertains to technological change that solely 
affects the output of a specific product. In order to do this we write the production 
function for good i as )( iiii vfx θ= . A change in technology will therefore be 
equivalent to a price change. In other words, for any given factor input vi, an increase 
in θi will yield a correspondingly higher value of production. This allows us to write 
the revenue function as ri(θipi, vi). Since we have equi-proportional changes of 
revenue for equi-proportional changes in prices and the shift parameter, it follows 
that )/()/( iiiiii prpr ∂∂=∂∂ θθ . Setting θi =1 and normalizing prices to unity we 
get ip
i
ii rr =θ . In order to look at the welfare effect of product augmenting technical 
change we can make the appropriate substitution in (15). 
For further concreteness, let us assume that only two goods are produced in 
the economy. Then under product augmentation, iip
i xrr ii ==θ . Substituting in (20) 
we get the following expression 
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where pa stands for product augmenting. We now turn our attention to the next case. 
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3.1.2  Product Specific Factor Augmentation 
In this case, we consider a technological change that has the effect of 
augmenting factor usage in a particular industry. For instance, there may be labor-
augmenting technical progress in the production of labor intensive goods in a labor 
abundant economy. 
For specificity, we consider a two good, two factor industry with constant 
returns to scale. Let the unit cost function for the production of good i be )/( iii wc θ , 
where wi  represents the price of factor i. Since the revenue function is obtained by 
minimizing the value of factor endowments subject to the constraint that unit cost 
exceed or equal the price for all goods we have 
})/({min),,( iiiiii
w
iiii pwcvwvpr
i
≥= θθ   
Let μ be the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the price constraint. Then 
rip = μ, and riθ = μ(wi/θ i 2)ci1, where ci1 denotes the partial derivative of c with respect 
to its first argument. Again, for concreteness, we use the previous result where        
rip = μ = xi; we then get riθ = xi ci1wi/θi2, which when evaluated at θi = 1 yields          
riθ = xici1wi. Consequently, 
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where psfa stands for product specific factor augmentation.  
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Comparing the two the elasticities (21) and (22) we obtain the following 
result: 
Result 1: If θi=1, iS
i
D αα ≠  and (19) is negative, then paipsfai ηη < ,consequently, by 
(16) the best response tariff associated with product specific factor augmenting 
technology, psfaτ  ,is higher than the best response tariff associated with technology 
that is merely product augmenting, paτ , i.e. psfaτ > paτ . If (19) is positive then 
pa
i
psfa
i ηη >  and psfaτ < paτ . 
 
This result follows from the inverse relationship between ηi and best response 
tariffs as laid down earlier. 
 
3.1.3 General factor augmentation: 
 
In this case technological progress augments factor endowments all round. 
Thus, θ simply becomes a scalar multiple of endowments in the revenue function 
which we now write as ri(pi, θ ivi).  
Recalling (16) we can see that the conditions for country i and country j to 
enjoy positive gains from trade are, respectively 
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and        
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General factor augmentation causes an improvement in the marginal contribution of 
the rθ dθ term and increases the value of the first term in the above expression 
suggesting an unambiguous improvement in overall welfare. However, 
immisserizing growth cannot be ruled out unless we impose more restrictions on the 
parameters. It is not unreasonable to posit that changes in the θ multiple could have 
an effect on factor and product prices, however, according to the formulation above θ 
does not affect these directly. 
Returning to the revenue function, if vi is normalized to 1 and, as before, we 
set the initial values of θ i equal to 1 as well, we get iv
i
ii rr =θ . In the 2 good case, we 
have already seen that ii xr i =θ . It then follows that substitution of this result in (19) 
will yield identical results to that of (20), which leads to the following: 
 
Result 2: When there is general factor augmenting technology, the compensated 
price elasticity of import demand is the same as that which prevails under product 
augmenting technology. Consequently, the associated best response tariffs will also 
be the same i.e. psfaτ > paτ if (19) is negative and psfaτ < paτ if (19) is positive. 
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General factor augmentation makes more factors available, thus it is possible 
to employ greater quantities of factors in the productive process. If that is indeed the 
case, then it should not be surprising that the results are indistinguishable from the 
product augmenting case – greater usage of any particular factor in the production of 
specific goods would certainly boost output. As an example, we might consider that 
product augmentation is simply the result of more labor being employed in a labor 
intensive industry. General factor augmentation would also make more labor 
available with exactly the same results. 
 
3.2 Unequal Factor Proportions 
Case 2: 0 < θi < 1, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ≠ i
S
i
Di
α
αθ  
When 0 < θi < 1, then iS
i
D
ii
S
i
D ααθαα −>−  but the sign of 
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
−
ii
S
i
D
i
S
i
D
θαα
αα
cannot be determined with certainty. Let this quantity be denoted by φi. 
Also, let the value of θi that satisfies the conditions laid out above be denoted by iθ~ . 
First of all we have 
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As before, expanding the numerator inside the brackets gives us the 
expression iiiD
i
D
iiiii rTdr i παατθϕ θ ˆ]1)[1( −−+ which tells us that (24) could be 
positive or negative depending upon the sign and relative values of the terms.   
 
3.2.1 Product Augmenting Technological Change 
 
Analogous to 3.1.1 the production function for good i is )( iiii vfx θ= . A 
change in technology is equivalent to a price change which means for any given 
factor input vi, an increase in θi will yield a correspondingly higher value of 
production. We can then write the revenue function as ri(θipi, vi). Again, with equi-
proportional changes of revenue for equi-proportional changes in prices and the shift 
parameter, it follows that )/()/( iiiiii prpr ∂∂=∂∂ θθ . Setting ii θθ ~=  we 
get ipi
i
i
ii r
pr ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθ ~ . Now,
ii
p xr i =  (by duality) so that ii
i
i xpr i ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθ ~ . Substituting this 
expression in (24) and normalizing prices to unity we get the following expression 
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We make use of this expression in the analysis that follows. 
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3.2.2  Product Specific Factor Augmentation 
 
Again, for specificity, we consider a two good, two factor industry with 
constant returns to scale. The unit cost function for the production of good i is 
)/( iii wc θ , where wi  represents the price of factor i. The revenue function is 
obtained by minimizing the value of factor endowments subject to the constraint that 
unit cost exceed or equal the price for all goods  
 
})/({min),,( iiiiii
w
iiii pwcvwvpr
i
≥= θθ   
 
μ is the Lagrangean multiplier associated with the price constraint. Then rip = 
μ, and riθ = μ(wi/θ i 2)ci1, where ci1 denotes the partial derivative of c with respect to 
its first argument. Optimization and duality yields rip = μ = xi, also riθ = xi ci1wi/θi2, 
which when evaluated at iθ~  yields i
i
i
ii cwxr i 12~ ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛= θθ . Consequently, 
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Comparing the two the elasticities we obtain the following result: 
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Result 3: When 10 << iθ  and i
S
i
Di
α
αθ ≠ , then θθ ηη
~~
pa
i
psfa
i <  if (24) is negative 
which means that papsfa ττ > . The opposite holds true when (24) is positive i.e. 
θθ ηη
~~
pa
i
psfa
i >  and papsfa ττ < . 
 
It is to be noted that this result is similar to result 1 in that if the compensated 
price elasticity of import demand under product specific factor augmenting 
technology (psfa) is lower than corresponding elasticity under product augmenting 
technology (pa), the associated tariff under psfa will be greater than the associated 
tariff under pa. 
 
3.2.3 General Factor Augmentation: 
 
As we recall, in this case technological progress augments factor endowments 
all round and θ simply becomes a scalar multiple of endowments in the revenue 
function which we now write as ri(pi, θ ivi). Since a one percent change in θi has the 
same effect as a one percent change in vi we can write )/()/( iiiiii vrvr ∂∂=∂∂ θθ  
If vi and prices are normalized to 1 and, as before, we set the value of θ i 
equal to iθ~ , we get ivii ii rr =θθ~ . In the 2 good case, we have already seen that 
iii xr i =θθ~ . It then follows that substitution of this result in (24) will yield identical 
results to that of (25), which leads to the following: 
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Result 4: When 10 << iθ  and i
S
i
Di
α
αθ ≠ , if there is general factor augmenting 
technology, the compensated price elasticity of import demand is the same as that 
which prevails under product augmenting technology. Consequently, the associated 
best response tariffs will also be the same.  
 
Result 4 is similar to result 2 in that gfapapsfa τττ => if (24) is negative and 
vice-versa. 
 
3.3  Unequal Factor Proportions, θ i >1 
Case 3: θi > 1, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ≠ i
S
i
Di
α
αθ  
When θi > 1, then iiS
i
D
i
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i
D θαααα −>− , and the sign of ⎟⎟⎠
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⎜⎜⎝
⎛
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is 
indeterminate. As before let this quantity be denoted by φi and 
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Expansion of the numerator terms contained inside the brackets gives us the 
familiar expression iiiD
i
D
iiiii rTdr i παατθϕ θ ˆ]1)[1( −−+ which tells us that (23) can 
be either negative or positive, furthermore, let iθ( denote the value of θi >1. 
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3.3.1 Comparison of Product Augmenting and Product Specific Factor 
Augmenting Technology 
 
In processes analogous to 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 we can obtain the following 
expressions 
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Inspection of the two elasticities shows that they differ only in the arguments 
of the second term inside square brackets. Without knowing precisely the values of 
w, c and θ it is not possible to ascertain the relative magnitude of the two elasticities 
with complete un-ambiguity. Given that θi >1, it is tempting to conclude that the 
second term inside parenthesis of (28) is smaller than its counterpart in (27), this is 
by no means certain as we do not know the relative contribution of w and c. By 
extension, we also cannot draw any certain conclusions regarding the effect upon 
external tariffs under a regime of general factor augmentation. 
 
Result 5: When θi > 1, ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ≠ i
S
i
Di
α
αθ , no clear conclusions can be drawn about 
external tariffs under different technological regimes. 
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The following table provides a concise summary of the results obtained so far 
Table – 1  
External Tariffs under Different Parameterizations of θ and 
Different Technological Regimes 
Elasticity θi Tariff Ranking 
ηi  <  0 10 ≤< iθ gfapapsfa τττ =>  
ηi  >  0 10 ≤< iθ gfapapsfa τττ =>  
ηi  <  0 θi > 1 Uncertain 
ηi  >  0 θi > 1 Uncertain 
psfa = product specific factor augmentation                )/;( iS
i
D
ii
S
i
D ααθαα ≠≠  
pa = product augmenting 
gfa = general factor augmentation 
 
 
4  Empirical Investigation 
This section explores the existence of empirical evidence for the key question 
posited, namely, is there a link between technology and tariffs? Prior literature 
examining this specific point is almost non-existent. There does exist, however 
(within the broader category of empirical research into the determinants of trade), a 
strand of literature which considers technology differences between countries as an 
explanatory variable that drives trade. Martin and Velazquez (2002) find that the 
larger a country’s endowment of technological capital in relation to that of its trade 
partners, the higher the export/import ratio of its bilateral trade. Claro’s (2003) paper 
has already been mentioned. In it he looks at the evolution of tariffs since the mid 
1980’s across developed and developing countries and finds that while overall tariffs 
have fallen significantly, they have shifted towards protecting more capital-intensive 
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sectors, with the bias being stronger in low wage countries. Incidentally, this paper is 
the only one where technology has been explicitly considered as a factor affecting 
the formation of tariffs. 
A potential difficulty arises in obtaining a precise measure of “technology”. 
We recall that in the theoretical part of this paper, technology was described by a 
shift parameter θ which was interpreted as a factor intensity parameter. Such an 
interpretation, in fact, helps us in establishing a meaningful measure of technology. 
Kakkar (2002) has shown, within the context of the Balassa – Samuelson model and 
using a sample of 14 OECD countries, that the capital – labor ratio in both the traded 
and non-traded goods sectors is co-integrated with total factor productivity (TFP), 
the implication being that the former can serve as an appropriate proxy of the latter. 
It is not unreasonable to conclude therefore that a country with a high capital to labor 
ratio and thus having a high TFP is possessive of a higher “level” of technology. In 
fact the use of the capital-labor ratio as a proxy for technology abounds in the 
literature. It is used by both Claro and Martin et al for example. Caselli and Coleman 
(2003) take a step further and define technology as a particular realization of the 
vector of efficiencies associated with unskilled labor, skilled labor and capital. 
Martin and Velazquez (2002) also chose GDP per capita as an instrumental variable 
for technological capital. The literature thus allows us to consider various ‘measures’ 
of technology. We consider the following – the capital-labor ratio, the ratio of skilled 
to unskilled labor, GDP per capita, Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the wage ratio of 
skilled to unskilled labor and the interest rate (i.e. the price of capital). 
 30  
These measures of technology can then be regressed against average tariff 
rates of different countries. To avoid the biases associated with average tariff rates 
(i.e. the simple mean of tariffs) we use weighted average tariff rates with the weights 
being the share of total imports of a particular industry. The tariff rates used are from 
the World Bank and reported in the “Index of Economic Freedom” published by the 
Heritage Foundation (and can be found on the website www.heritage.org). The 
capital-labor ratio data are taken from Caselli and Coleman (2000) from where the 
ratio of skilled to unskilled labor was also computed, the Total Factor Productivity 
numbers are from Islam (1995). Complete data was only available for a cross-section 
sample of 42 countries.   
In order to control for possible endogeneity we also carried out a two stage 
least squares (2SLS) instrumental variable regression after conducting Hausman – 
Wu tests. In order to be a good instrument the variable chosen for this regression 
should have the desirable property of being correlated with the regressor it 
substitutes and not with the residuals. The regressor that we felt would best comply 
with both requirements is the distance to the equator. In other words technology 
would be less ‘pervasive’ in countries that are closer to the equator, but the distance 
from the equator will have no bearing on the variables chosen as proxies for 
technology. The use of this particular regressor as an instrumental variable can be 
seen in Habodaszova (2003)8.  We obtained the distances from Latitude co-ordinates 
published by the CIA in their World Factbook available online at www.cia.gov. 
                                                 
8 In Habodaszova (2003) the distance to equator was an instrumental variable indicating the degree of 
corruption. I would like to thank Professor Michael Alexeev for suggesting use of this instrument in 
this case.  
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 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the data set used in this analysis. 
Table 3 shows the matrix of correlation coefficients of the variables.  
 
Table – 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation
Minimum Maximum Number of 
Observations
 
Tariff 
 
6.84 
 
5.80 
 
0 
 
28.2 
 
42 
 
Per Capita GDP 
 
14,898 
 
10,068 
 
1,998 
 
35,439 
 
42 
 
Capital Labor Ratio  
 
36,030 
 
30,398 
 
2,748 
 
107,870 
 
42 
 
Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
3.30 
 
6.35 
 
0.312 
 
38.17 
 
42 
 
Wage Ratio of 
Skilled to Unskilled 
Labor 
 
1.53 
 
0.35 
 
1.10 
 
3.16 
 
42 
 
Interest Rate 
 
15.15 
 
11.62 
 
1.97 
 
57.62 
 
42 
 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
 
12.37 
 
8.25 
 
2 
 
38.5 
 
42 
 
Distance to Equator 
 
2807.14 
 
1,908.31 
 
111.11 
 
6,888.89 
 
42 
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Table – 3 
Matrix of Correlation Coefficients  
  Tariff 
Per 
Capita 
GDP 
Capital 
Labor 
Ratio 
Ratio of 
Skilled to 
Unskilled 
Labor 
Wage 
Ratio of 
Skilled to 
Unskilled 
Labor 
Interest 
Rate 
Total 
Factor 
Productivity 
 
 
Distance 
To 
Equator 
 
Tariff 1       
 
 
Per Capita GDP -0.628 1      
 
 
Capital Labor 
Ratio -0.591 0.964 1     
 
 
Ratio of Skilled 
to Unskilled 
Labor -0.308 0.577 0.518 1    
 
 
Wage Ratio of 
Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 0.221 -0.462 -0.419 -0.160 1   
 
 
Interest Rate 0.413 -0.470 -0.482 -0.276 0.301 1  
 
 
Total Factor 
productivity -0.630 0.831 0.717 0.503 -0.371 -0.493 1 
 
 
Distance to 
Equator -0.457 0.742 0.722 0.389 -0.383 -0.390 0.514 
 
 
1 
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Table 4 shows ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of bivariate regressions 
with tariffs as the dependant variable.    
Table 4  
Bivariate Regressions: OLS, Dependant Variable – Tariffs 
(t – statistic in parenthesis) 
Independent Variable Coefficient Constant R2 
 
Capital Labor Ratio 
 
-0.00011* 
(-4.64) 
 
10.90* 
(9.55) 
 
0.349 
 
Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
-0.281* 
(-2.048) 
 
7.767* 
(7.975) 
 
0.095 
 
Per Capita GDP 
 
-0.00036* 
(-5.12) 
 
12.23* 
(9.64) 
 
0.395 
 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
 
-0.443* 
(5.133) 
 
12.32* 
(9.64) 
 
0.397 
 
Wage Ratio of Skilled 
to Unskilled Labor 
 
3.661* 
(1.431) 
 
1.244* 
(0.310) 
 
0.049 
 
Interest Rate 
 
-0.443* 
(-5.133) 
 
12.316* 
(9.636) 
 
0.397 
*Significant at the 5% level (critical t = 2.01954) 
The coefficients of all the independent variables except the Wage Ratio of 
Skilled to Unskilled Labor are negative and significant at the 5% level. All the 
independent variables bar one have the expected signs. If these variables are 
interpreted as measuring the “level” of technology, then the country with a “higher 
level” of technology should have a lower corresponding average tariff rate, thus the 
negative relationship between average tariffs and the various measures of technology 
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is apparent from the results shown above. However, the fit of the model does not 
exceed 50% for any of the measures.  
 
The following table shows the OLS estimates when a dummy variable 
indicating OECD status (=1 if OECD, 0 otherwise) is incorporated.  
Table – 5 
OLS Regression with Dummy Variables, Dependant Variable – Tariffs 
(t – statistic in parenthesis) 
Independent Variable Coefficient Dummy Constant Adjusted 
R2 
 
Capital Labor Ratio 
 
-0.000007 
(-1.734) 
 
-3.144 
(-1.179) 
 
10.500* 
(8.855) 
 
0.372 
 
Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
-0.068 
(-0.512) 
 
-6.519* 
(-3.679) 
 
9.236* 
(9.836) 
 
0.294 
 
Per Capita GDP 
 
-0.0003* 
(-2.358) 
 
-2.295 
(-0.931) 
 
11.708* 
(8.426) 
 
0.378 
 
Total Factor Productivity 
 
-0.319* 
(-3.192) 
 
-3.800* 
(-2.200) 
 
12.048* 
(9.820) 
 
0.436 
 
Wage Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
0.016 
(0.007) 
 
-6.910* 
(-3.981) 
 
9.118* 
(2.306) 
 
0.289 
 
Interest Rate 
 
0.079 
(1.041) 
 
-5.904* 
(-3.185) 
 
7.605* 
(4.383) 
 
0.308 
*Significant at the 5% level (critical t = 2.01954) 
 
The results with the inclusion of the dummy variables show that while the 
coefficients of four of the six measures are negative only the coefficients of Total 
Factor Productivity and its associated dummy variable are statistically significant. 
Also the corresponding adjusted R squared is the greatest of all six. This fact, in 
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addition to the results reported in table 4 suggests that Total Factor Productivity 
might be the best indicator of the level of technology in a country. 
 A Hausman – Wu test to check for possible endogeneity in the explanatory 
variables was conducted with the chosen instrument being the distance to the 
equator. The results indicated that three out of the six variables exhibited 
endogeneity and we performed corresponding Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) 
Instrumental Variables (IV) regressions with the results reported below.   
Table – 6  
2SLS IV Regressions, Dependant Variable – Tariffs 
(t – statistic in parenthesis) 
Independent Variable Coefficient Constant 
 
Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
-1.072* 
(-2.300) 
 
10.379* 
(5.422) 
 
Wage Ratio of Skilled to 
Unskilled Labor 
 
19.792* 
(2.149) 
 
-23.405 
(-1.657) 
 
 
Interest Rate 
 
0.585* 
(2.496) 
 
 
-2.030 
(-0.548) 
*Significant at the 5% level (critical t = 2.01954) 
R squared are not reported, as we have departed from OLS it is no longer 
bound in [0,1]. 
We note that while all the coefficients are statistically significant at the 5% 
level only one, the Ratio of Skilled to Unskilled Labor has a negative sign. 
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The principle conclusion that can be drawn from this section is that an 
inverse relationship exists between weighted tariff rates and certain measures of 
technology such as the Capital – Labor Ratio, Total Factor Productivity and the 
Ratio of Skilled to Unskilled Labor with the latter two standing out as more suitable 
because of statistical significance and consistent expected signs. 
It would be interesting to repeat this empirical exercise with a richer panel 
data set, especially one that would allow us to carry out time series analysis and look 
at ‘within’ and ‘between’ effects. Inclusion of more countries and a more refined 
computation of the weighted average tariff rate would also be desirable. However, 
the principal objective of the exercise was to confirm our expectation that technology 
and tariffs are negatively related. In this respect we feel we have succeeded. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper is a first attempt to examine whether technology has a bearing on 
the selection of tariffs by two trading partners. We have adapted the dual, general 
equilibrium techniques set forth by Dixit and Norman (1980) and used by 
Syropoulos (2002) in his examination of tariff preferences within the context of 
customs unions. We have seen that it is indeed possible to establish a functional 
dependency between technology and tariff formation. Our procedure involved first 
establishing the case that import tariffs could be ranked based on comparisons of the 
compensated price elasticity of import demand, and then obtaining closed-form 
expressions of that elasticity containing a technological shift variable. Interpreted as 
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a factor intensity parameter, we then calibrated the shift variable under three separate 
specifications and attempted to rank best response tariffs by ranking the elasticities. 
We found that tariffs in the case of product specific factor augmenting technology 
are higher than the corresponding tariffs under a regime of specific product 
augmenting technology. We noted that when technology is characterized as being 
generally factor augmenting, tariffs mirror the product augmenting case. 
Obviously a lot remains to be done. A more detailed empirical exercise has 
already been mentioned. Several extensions readily suggest themselves. It would be 
interesting to see whether inter country or inter sectoral differences in technology 
motivate trading partners to form preferential trading arrangements or otherwise. 
More precise specifications of technology could be formulated and incorporated in 
the model during the set up stage, though this is unlikely to ease the analytical 
tractability mentioned in the introduction. An interesting exercise might be to 
examine the feasibility of constructing a dynamic model whereby it would be 
possible to see the evolution of tariff formation as technology itself evolves. These 
and the study of various other asymmetries that affect trade and the global economy 
is left as the agenda for future research.  
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The Impact of Country Size on the Negotiation of 
Sustainable Tariffs 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines reciprocal trade liberalization in a two country setting that 
allows for asymmetry in country size. The analysis proceeds along the lines of 
Furusawa (1999) wherein it is suggested that as long as status-quo tariffs are 
invariant during the negotiation process, the country with the higher status-quo tariff 
rate benefits more from the negotiation and vice-versa. We formalize this insight by 
explicitly introducing country size and asymmetric status-quo tariffs in a Rubinstein-
type bargaining model. Our findings indicate that a large country will gain more 
from tariff negotiations regardless of the patience exhibited by the smaller country 
during the bargaining process. 
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1 Introduction 
For several decades now, countries have engaged in mutual trade 
liberalization. Tariff and non-tariff barriers have been lowered either through 
bilateral negotiations or through multilateral agreements such as those engendered by 
the numerous rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). A 
feature of international trade disputes is that some are settled quickly, whereas others 
last much longer. In addition, some disputes are resolved due to a unilateral 
concession by one side while others involve reciprocal concessions. Table 1 gleaned 
from Bac and Raff (1997) and other sources shows several trade conflicts beginning 
from early mercantile history up to the present. Inspection of the table shows that in 
a good number of cases the larger country enjoys the benefit of a favorable 
settlement. This is true of cases 3, 4,5,6,7,9,19, 20 and 22. In most cases where the 
trading partners are of roughly equal size, notably those involving the USA and 
Europe (EEC or EU), either a compromise has been reached (12,13,17) or the trade 
disputes have lingered on (15, 21,24). Country size effects in trade disputes therefore 
seem to be a pertinent issue deserving of further exploration.  
Furusawa (1999) points out that bilateral tariff setting usually involves a 
prisoner’s dilemma problem. An individual country is always better off setting a 
positive optimum tariff (Johnson, 1953-54) regardless of the level of the other 
countries tariff. However, if both countries set an optimum tariff, both are worse off. 
Consequently the need for cooperation in order to extract the full gains from trade 
exists. 
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Despite the need for cooperation, external enforcement of such is not 
possible. International institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) can 
arbitrate trade disputes, but cannot force countries to maintain low, cooperative tariff 
levels. Cooperation, thus, has to be self enforcing. As Johnson (1953-54) suggests, 
the fear of triggering a trade war acts an incentive to engage in free trade. 
A large body of literature examining this point exists. The problem has been 
formally addressed by embedding it in a finitely repeated game (Jensen and Thursby, 
1990) and an infinitely repeated game (Dixit, 1987). Such formulations, however, 
fail to shed any light on the exact level of cooperative tariffs that should be selected. 
Bagwell and Staiger (1990, 1997a, 1997b) use a pair of most-cooperative, symmetric 
tariffs as the solution of symmetric games in similar contexts. The intuitive appeal of 
symmetric tariffs is greatly diminished, however, if countries do not share similar 
characteristics. 
In practice, explicit mutual negotiations form the basis of most trade 
liberalization. Thus, the appropriate way to analyze tariff formation among countries 
is to model a game in which the countries negotiate over tariff rates, and then enter a 
phase in which the negotiated agreements are implemented and sustained in a self-
enforcing manner. Bac and Raff (1997) adopt this strategy in modeling tariff-setting 
games. 
Furusawa (1999) has shown that patience affects trade negotiation results 
between two countries. Specifically, the more patient country gains most from the 
negotiation. The analysis is simplified by the assumption that the countries are 
symmetric in all respects except for the discount rates. Furusawa (1999) very 
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plausibly suggests that as long as countries do not change tariffs during the 
negotiation process, the country with the bigger (smaller) status-quo tariff rate 
benefits more (less) from negotiation thus: 
“……Provided that the countries are not allowed to change the tariffs during 
the negotiation, however, it is easy to see that the difference in the status quo 
tariffs affect the negotiation outcome in such a way that the country that has 
the higher (lower) status quo tariff rate benefits more (less) from the 
negotiation than predicted in the main analysis of the paper…….” 
We formalize this insight by explicitly introducing country size and 
asymmetric status-quo tariffs within the overall framework of Furusawa’s model. 
 
Table 1 
A Summary of Trade Conflicts 
Year Countries Involved Length of  Conflict Settlement Nature of Conflict/Sector 
1614-1617 United Provinces of 
Holland vs. England 
3 Years England Concedes 
Unilaterally 
Cockayne Project: England bans 
export of unfinished cloth to 
Holland 
1876, 1892 France vs. Germany  Germany Protests but 
does not pursue 
French export subsidies on iron 
1886-1893 Romania vs. Austria-
Hungary 
7 years Romania concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff war 
1886-1898 France vs. Italy 12 years Italy concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff war 
1892-1895 France vs. Switzerland 3 Years Switzerland concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff war 
1893-1894 Russia vs. Germany 1 Year Russia concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff war 
1894-1899 Germany vs. Spain 5 Years Compromise, 
advantage Germany 
Tariff war 
1903-1910 Canada vs. Germany 7 Years Germany concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff war over Germany’s MFN 
status 
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  Table -1 contd. 
 
  
1922 USA vs. 29 Countries  Unilateral concession 
by 29 countries 
between 1922 and 
1934 
Fordney-McCumber tariff 
1930-1947 USA vs. Japan, Italy, 
France, Spain, Britain etc. 
17 Years Settlement with 
Britain (1938); 
Geneva Round of 
GATT (1947) 
Smoot-Hawley tariff wars 
1932-1938 Britain vs. Ireland 6 Years Anglo-Irish 
agreement 
Tariff war 
1933-1934 Britain vs. France 1 Year Anglo-French trade 
agreement 
Trade war 
1962-1963 EEC vs. USA 1 Year GATT mediation Chicken war 
1969-1984 
(approx.) 
EEC vs. USA 15 Years Market sharing cartel Steel war 
1974 EEC vs. USA Indeterminate  Turkey war 
1975 EEC vs. USA < 1 Year EEC reduces export 
subsidies 
Cheese war 
1982-present Canada vs. USA  Indeterminate Softwood Lumber 
1985-1986 EEC vs. USA 1 Year Compromise Pasta war 
1985-1986 EEC vs. USA  EEC concedes Grain dispute 
1986 USA vs. South Korea  South Korea 
concedes unilaterally 
TV programs, motion pictures 
1986 USA vs. Taiwan  Taiwan concedes 
unilaterally 
Tariff calculations 
1999- 2003 USA vs. Japan 4 Years WTO rules against 
Japan 
Steel war 
2002-present USA vs. EU  Indeterminate Steel war 
2003-present USA vs. EU  Indeterminate GM agricultural products 
dispute 
Sources: Bac and Raff (1987), British Broadcasting Corporation, US State Department, Government of British 
Columbia, Canada 
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2 Theoretical Background 
2.1  Nash’s Bargaining Theory 
In this section we provide the underlying theoretical foundation of the 
analysis which follows. It is based upon Nash’s general approach to bargaining 
theory with the notation and exposition drawn mainly from Binmore (1987). The 
approach employed is strictly “game theoretic” i.e. only optimal play between 
rational players with individual goals is considered. “Behavioral” theories (theories 
which seek to describe individual behavior in practice) or “ethical” theories (theories 
which prescribe outcomes that are desirable from the viewpoint of society as a 
whole) are ignored for the purposes of our analysis. 
According to Nash (Binmore and Dasgupta, 1987) the most fundamental type 
of game is a contest – a formal two-person game in extensive form which is analyzed 
under the assumption that no pre-play communication is allowed. For contests, the 
most commonly used solution concept is the Nash equilibrium. However, for games 
other than contests, the possibility of pre-play interaction between players can have 
important bearings on the final outcomes. In a bargaining game, for example, if one 
player is able to make a pre-emptive offer, he enjoys a first mover advantage. The 
other player is then left with a “take it or leave it” position. The roles could be 
reversed, or simultaneous moves can be made, in which case the outcomes would be 
different. 
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The problem of pre-play interaction is dealt by Nash (1951) along the 
following lines –   
Let G denote a formal game. Let N denote a larger “negotiation game” 
wherein various possible steps in the pre-play negotiation procedure are played out 
and the negotiation procedure is formalized. A strategy for the formal game N tells 
us how to conduct the negotiations under all possible eventualities and how to 
choose a (possibly) mixed strategy for G contingent upon the course the negotiations 
took. The solution of the negotiation game, analyzed as a contest, leads to an 
outcome of the game G which is termed the “negotiated” outcome of G. 
A “bargaining contest” B associated with a game G is a negotiation contest in 
which any pair of negotiation strategies (one for each player) can be classified as 
either compatible or incompatible. If compatible, the choice of these negotiation 
strategies results in a pre-determined outcome of G which is called the “status quo”. 
In order to illustrate this point Binmore (1987) offers a simple example. He 
considers a standard Edgeworth market exchange in which two countries engage in a 
trade game. The first player has a quantity X of some commodity and the second 
player has quantity Y of some other commodity. This is transformed into a formal 
game G by stipulating that the strategies for the two players consist of the unilateral 
transmission of some proportion of their initial endowment to the other. Assuming 
that each player has a utility function defined over the set of relevant commodity 
bundles and that this is commonly known, an opportunity for barter now exists. 
Binmore and Dasgupta (1987) take the view, following Nash, that the results of the 
barter will depend on the nature of the strategies open to the players. In the absence 
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of binding agreements, the “negotiated” outcome of G will be the initial endowment 
point. Interesting negotiation outcomes will therefore emanate only from binding 
agreements. However, the nature of the negotiated outcomes will depend on the 
negotiating procedure and what the players regard as constituting the solution of the 
resulting negotiation contest. 
Nash considered a simple bargaining procedure in which each player 
simultaneously announces a real number. The announcements of the real numbers by 
the players represent a demand for an outcome of G which yield the players utility 
equivalent to their announcements. A pair of announcements is compatible if a pair 
of (possibly mixed) strategies for G exist whose implementation leads to each player 
receiving the utility demanded. Such compatibility results in a binding agreement to 
implement the strategy pair. Incompatibility of the demands results in status-quo. In 
this case that is the initial endowment (or “no-trade”) point. 
The original game G preceded by the bargaining procedure described above 
constitutes a bargaining contest B which has many Pareto-efficient Nash equilibria. 
Indeed, every Pareto-efficient outcome of G can be realized as the result of a Nash 
equilibrium of B under suitable concavity assumptions on the utility functions. Under 
such assumptions, with free disposal, the set k of achievable utility pairs is 
illustrated in the following figure 
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Figure – 1 
 
 
Under these circumstances, the demands d1 and d2 together constitute a Nash 
equilibrium B if and only if (d1, d2) is a Pareto efficient point of k.  
For the theory to hold, the players must recognize one of these Nash equilibria as 
the solution of the game. For this purpose the players require a “convention”. Such a 
convention may be observed through repeated plays of the game as long as; 
 
1. The players all subscribe to a common game theory. 
2. The games are played separately (i.e. the players do not treat the games as 
sub-games of a larger super-game). 
 
Provided the players observe a common convention, the bargaining contest B 
can be solved. This solution then determines the negotiated outcome of the original 
Y = d2 
X = d1 
Status Quo 
k 
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game G. In our particular example, the negotiated outcome consists of a contract to 
exchange specific quantities of X and Y. 
Now, the formal play of game G can be preceded by any number of 
bargaining procedures. At the same time there are also numerous conventions which 
might be used in the solution of the bargaining contests. Nash was of the view that 
despite the varied nature of the bargaining solutions, they all shared a common 
strategic structure and would thus lead to similar negotiated outcomes. In support of 
this view, Nash (1950) formulated a system of axioms for the negotiated outcome of 
a game G with given status quo. On the basis of his axioms, Nash was able to show 
that only one negotiated outcome (in terms of utilities) is possible. This is the “Nash 
bargaining solution”. We provide a brief account of Nash’s system of axioms 
following Binmore (1987) in the following section. 
 
2.2  Nash’s System of Axioms (Binmore 1987) 
There is a set of formal two-person games G in extensive form with each 
terminal node labeled with an element ω from an outcome space Ω = Ω(G). The 
lottery λ in which the prize ωj is obtained with probability pj is denoted by 
 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧=
421
21
...
...
ppp
kωωωλ  
 
The set of all such lotteries with prizes in Ω is denoted by L = L (Ω). Each 
player has a preference relation defined on L which is described by a von Neumann – 
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Morgenstern utility function defined on Ω. The linear extensions of these utility 
functions to L are denoted by 21 Raφ and 22 Raφ . 2Raφ is defined by 
 
1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ))φ λ φ λ φ λ=  
  
The payoff region X = X(G) for the game G is  
 
( )X Lφ=  
 
where the set X is a convex subset of R2 and X is also assumed to be compact. 
The play of the game G is preceded by a period of bargaining. One of a set of 
formal bargaining procedures are used, embedding G a greater bargaining contest B. 
A pair of bargaining strategies (one strategy for each player) are either compatible or 
incompatible. If incompatible, their play results in a pre-specified outcome q of L 
called the status quo which is denoted as 
)(qφξ =  
 
and depicted in the following diagram 
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Figure – 2 
 
We note further that 
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The set of all pairs (X, ξ) with these properties is denoted by D. 
The set of axioms Nash gave for his bargaining solution is a list of 
restrictions on the function 2: R→Df . Nash showed that his axioms specify a 
unique function 2: R→Df . The axioms, which are mathematical properties of the 
function f are 
Axiom 1 (feasibility) 
 
XXf ∈< ),( ξξ  
 
 
X 
  ξ 
x1 
x2 
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Axiom 2 (invariance) 
For any strictly increasing, affine transformation 22: RR →α , 
 
),(),( ξααξα XfXf =  
Axiom 3(efficiency) 
 
XXf ∉⇒> yy ),( ξ  
 
Axiom 4 (independence of irrelevant alternatives) 
 
),(),(),( ξξξ XfYfXYXf =⇒⊆∈  
 
Axiom 5 (symmetry) 
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Nash shows that, with these assumptions, ( , )f X ξ is the point 2R∈x at which 
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ξ
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is achieved. The axioms determine f uniquely. The uniquely determined function f(X, 
ξ) is called the ‘Nash bargaining solution’ of the game G. 
A diagrammatic exposition illustrates things more clearly. Given τ (0<τ<1), 
we can define gτ(X, ξ) = T, where T is the point indicated in figure 3. 
 
Figure – 3 
 
RS is a supporting line to the convex set X and T is chosen so that ST/SR = τ. 
An alternative way of defining T is the point where  
 
{ ττ
ξ
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is achieved. Now gτ is referred to as the “asymmetric Nash bargaining solution’ of G 
and τ and τ – 1 are the associated “bargaining powers”. It is to be noted that gτ 
satisfies axiom 5 iff τ = 1/2.  
  ξ 
 S 
R 
 
T 
X 
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While the asymmetric Nash Bargaining solution forms the cornerstone of our 
analysis, an important aspect of the bargaining game B ought to be noted. We recall 
that B is a separable bargaining contest which separates into n Nash demand games 
B1, B2, …, Bn, if that is indeed the case the question naturally arises as to which Nash 
equilibria, played separately in B1, B2, …, Bn, yield a Pareto-efficient outcome for B? 
The answer to this question is that the pairs of demands made in B1, B2, …, Bn must 
all be asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions for the n separate games, all of which 
correspond to the same value of τ. The necessity of a convention to arrive at a 
bargaining solution has already been explained within the context of repeated plays 
of the game. However, if only a single game is considered, any convention that is 
adopted will necessarily appear to be arbitrary. Consequently, there is a need for a 
bargaining contest in which a solution can be identified without appealing to any 
convention. By applying further structure to the Nash demand game Binmore (1987) 
comes up with a couple of “modified” Nash demand games where the distortion 
imposed by the additional structure is sufficiently small to yield results that are 
approximately equal to the Nash bargaining solution. One of these games is adopted 
by Furusawa in his analysis of tariff negotiations. We elaborate below. 
 
2.3  A Modified Nash Demand Game 
 
In the simple Nash demand game the players were required to make 
simultaneous demands and the set of feasible payoffs was perfectly known. This is 
not a particularly realistic situation. Binmore (1987, pp 65 – 70) has analyzed a game 
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where the second requirement was relaxed; however, for our purposes we are 
interested in the game where the first assumption is relaxed and the players make 
sequential moves. 
It is assumed that at time t = 0 the first player makes a demand (or offer) 
which is either accepted or rejected by the second player. Acceptance leads to the 
termination of negotiations with the first player receiving his demand and the second 
player receiving the maximum utility consistent with the first player’s payoff. 
Rejection of the first player’s demand leads to a continuation of negotiations with the 
second player making a demand (or counter-offer) after some time interval T which 
the first player can either accept or reject, so on and so forth. 
It is further supposed that the players react negatively to the delay of an 
agreement. This is modeled by assuming that the set of feasible payoffs at time t is  
 
}),(:),{ 21 XyxyxX
tt
t ∈= δδ  
 
where 0<δ1<1 and 0<δ2<1. Players are allowed to have possibly different discount 
rates δ1 and δ2. In the event that no demand (or offer) is ever accepted both players 
receive zero. The status-quo is therefore zero. 
Using results from Rubinstein (1982) who describes the set of perfect 
equilibrium outcomes for a class of games embodying the structure described above 
and who shows that there is a unique perfect equilibrium outcome, Binmore shows 
that the solution is an approximation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution 
with bargaining power τ where  
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21
2
loglog
log
δδ
δτ +=  
 
Provided the time interval T is sufficiently small (T Æ0). We note that δ1 = δ2 leads 
to the symmetric Nash bargaining solution where τ = 1/2. Furthermore T → 0 
approximates the case where demands (or offers) are made simultaneously.  
 
2.4  Application of Nash’s Bargaining Theory to Strategic Tariff Games. 
  
The analytical framework established above is especially suitable for the 
analysis of strategic tariff games. Dixit (1987), in particular, provides a very 
illuminating early exposition of the use of strategic game theory in the study of trade 
policy. In particular he notes that it makes good sense to conduct trade policy 
analysis within the broader framework of non-cooperative game theory and points 
out several pertinent reasons why: 
• Trans-national enforcement mechanisms for multi-lateral or bilateral co-
operative arrangements are weak at best. 
• The laws of contract and tort are usually absent or inapplicable in an 
international setting. 
• National sovereignty often affords foreign governments immunity from legal 
sanction. 
• Supra-national protocols established under the GATT or the WTO are 
bypassed or even flouted. 
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Given these points, it is wise to adopt a framework in which the players act 
independently and any co-operation that emerges is tacit and sustained by the 
players’ self-interest. Factors which sustain this interest may include the possibility 
of the arrangement collapsing or prospective ‘punishment’ meted out by the other 
country, but not steps taken by any external trans-national body. 
As has been mentioned in the introduction, Furusawa (1999) makes use of 
Nash and Binmore’s results in his analysis. In the next section we describe it in some 
detail as we feel it is central to the analysis which follows. 
 
3 Country Size and Tariff Negotiations 
  
In this section we provide an exposition of Furusawa’s model of tariff  
negotiations when the two countries involved are of equal size. This analysis is later 
extended to incorporate size asymmetries. 
 Furusawa’s basic model is a two phase game played by the governments of 
two countries which are assumed to be equal in size. Each imposes a common 
optimum tariff on its imports. This tariff, τN, prevails until the countries agree upon a 
new pair of tariffs via negotiation with τi for i = 1, 2 denoting the rate of the specific 
tariff country i imposes on its imports. Each government tries to maximize the social 
welfare of its own country. Government i for i = 1, 2 discounts the future at rate ri. It 
is assumed that government 1 is more patient than government 2 i.e. r1 < r2. 
In the first (negotiation) phase of the game, the governments alternate in 
offering a pair of tariff rates (τ1, τ2), until an offer is accepted by the other 
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government in the manner of Rubinstein (1982). To eliminate the first mover 
advantage in Rubinstein’s bargaining model, Furusawa considers a limit situation in 
which the time lag of successive offers approaches zero. This formulation preserves 
the effect of patience on the bargaining outcome since the difference in patience does 
not vanish even in the limit. 
The implementation phase begins as soon as the two governments agree on a 
new pair of tariff rates which replace the status quo tariffs. During this phase the 
governments continue to set the tariffs at the agreed upon levels until a government 
defects by selecting some other tariff rate. The defection is discovered and punished 
after a time lag of Δ. It is assumed that both governments adopt a trigger strategy in 
which they would revert back to τN once punishment starts. The implementation 
phase is considered to be an infinitely repeated game in discrete time of period 
length Δ, and a mutually beneficial, cooperative outcome is supported by a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. The discount factor of government i is given by Δ−= iri eδ  ; 
furthermore, we have δ1> δ2 from the assumption r1 < r2, and δi falls as Δ increases. 
Furusawa notes that the effect of difference in patience on bargaining power during 
trade negotiations is twofold – on the one hand patience pays off in the negotiation 
phase as it enhances bargaining power, however, impatience pays during the 
implementation phase since the resulting greater incentive to defect enables 
governments to claim a larger share of the fruits of cooperation. When the two 
countries are of equal size, the former effect outweighs the latter if the time lag 
between defection and punishment in the implementation phase is short, and vice-
versa. 
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Furusawa defines the stage game payoff for government i 
as ∫ Δ −−0 ),( dtWe iitri ττ , where W(•) denotes the instantaneous social welfare function 
calculated as the sum of the total surpluses from the importable and exportable goods 
markets, and is equal to [(1 – δi)/ri]W(τi, τ-i). Using a partial equilibrium framework, 
Furusawa derives explicit expressions for M(τ) and X(τ), the sum of which is W(•). 
The unique stage Nash equilibrium tariff, τN, is calculated to be 1/31. The symmetry 
assumption allows the use of the same function W(•) for each country. Figure 4 
illustrates the world market for good i and the resulting M(τi) + X(τ-i) reaches a 
maximum at τ = 0. This implies that the two countries joint payoff is maximized at 
free trade when τi = τ-i = 0. 
 
Figure – 4: Surpluses from imports and exports of good i 
  
                                                 
1 The function M is derived as follows: Consider the world market for good i , and let px and τ denote 
the price of that good in the exporting country and tariff rate of the importing country respectively. 
The world market clearing condition (1- px ) + (1- px – τ) = 1 implies px = (1 – τ)/2 which gives us the 
price for the importing country and quantity of imports as (1 + τ)/2 and (1 – τ)/2 respectively. The 
instantaneous total surplus in the importable-good market is the sum of consumer and producer 
surplus M(τ) = (1/2)(1 – (1+τ)/2)((1- τ)/2) + τ ((1 – τ)/2) = (1 – τ)(1 + 3τ)/8, the FOC M’(τ) = 1/3 gives 
us the Nash equilibrium tariff of the stage game. 
 
Price 
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M(τi) 
    X(τ-i) 
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In order to examine size effects we require tariffs to be expressed in terms of 
fundamental endowment parameters. In fact, doing so will allow us to study the 
effects not only of size, but also of dissimilar status quo tariff rates. Kennan and 
Riezman (1988) present a model of tariff wars where Nash equilibrium tariffs are 
indeed expressed in terms of endowments. We use the results of Kennan and 
Riezman in Furusawa’s basic model to analyze the effects on tariff negotiation of the 
aforementioned asymmetries. 
 Kennan and Riezman (1988) use a model with two countries A and B, and 
two goods X and Y. Each country contains many consumers with identical quasi-
linear utility functions UA = XAYA, and UB = XBYB. The world endowment of each 
commodity is defined to be one unit. Country A has γ units of X and B has 1 – γ 
units; country B has μ units of Y and A has 1– μ units. Using this basic framework, 
Kennan and Riezman (1988) show that the Nash equilibrium tariffs for countries A 
and B as functions of the endowments are 
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− μ
γ and 
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− γ
μ respectively 
(please see the appendix for an explicit derivation). These tariffs will correspond to 
τ1 and τ2 in our model where they will take the place of τN, the optimum stage Nash 
equilibrium tariff.   
We begin by mirroring the analysis of Furusawa. His baseline model, in 
which the countries are of equal size, is simply the case where τ1 = τ2 = τN, which we 
use as our starting point. In figure 5, R1 and R2 represent the reaction curves for 
countries 1 and 2 respectively, and the interaction of the curves shows the Nash 
equilibrium of the stage game. Two representative indifference curves corresponding 
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to W(τ1,τ2) and W(0,0) are also drawn. The closer an indifference curve is to the axis 
of its own tariff rate, the higher the corresponding welfare. 
 
 
Figure – 5: The stage game 
 
3.1 Negotiated Pairs of Sustainable Tariffs 
  
The fundamental premise of Furusawa’s model is that any pair of negotiated 
tariffs chosen for implementation must be self-enforcing. Each government i 
continues to set a cooperative tariff rate τi for as long as neither government has 
deviated from this pair in the past. Defection by at least one government will result 
in both governments setting their own tariff rates at τN in the next period and every 
period thereafter. This trigger strategy profile constitutes a known subgame perfect 
2τ  
1τ  
Nτ  
Nτ  
R1 
R2 
),( NN1 ττWw =  
)0,0(1 Ww =  
)0,0(2 Ww =  
450
w2 = W(τN , τN ) 
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equilibrium, and the set of all such pairs of sustainable tariff rates is referred to as the 
implementable set.  
The average discounted sum of government i’s stage game payoff is   
))(),((
1
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i
t
t
ii −
∞
= ⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −− ∑ ττδδδ                                                                      (1) 
 
where τi(t) and τ-i(t) denote the tariff rates of country i and –i (any number not i) in 
period t. Since government i would derive the maximum benefit from deviation 
when it sets the tariff rate at   τN, we can express the incentive constraint for 
government i as follows 
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The left hand side shows the average discounted payoff when both 
governments cooperate while the right hand side shows the average discounted 
payoff when only government i deviates. After the common term is dropped we have  
 
),(),()1(),( NNN ττδττδττ WWW iiiii +−≥ −−                                                     (3) 
 
We recall that the instantaneous social welfare of country i calculated as the 
sum of the total surpluses from the import and export goods markets is W:[0,1) × 
[0,1) → R and is defined by 
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)()(),( iiii XMW −− += ττττ                                                                                  (4) 
 
The functions M(τ) and X(τ) are shown by Furusawa to be concave and convex, 
respectively.  
Using (4) the incentive constraint (ICi) is simplified as  
 
{ })()()()( NN ττδττ XXMM iii −≤− −                                                                 (5) 
 
for i = 1, 2. A pair of tariffs (τ1, τ2) is in the implementable set if and only if IC1 and 
IC2 are simultaneously satisfied and τ1, τ2 ≥ 0. Figure 6 shows the incentive 
constraints for the two governments with the shaded area as the implementable set. 
The implementable set is the area which is surrounded by the two incentive 
constraints and the two axes of the (τ1, τ2) plane. The incentive constraints will shift 
out with an increase in δi as the more patient government i is more willing to 
cooperate in tariff setting. Importantly, in this case, the implementable set is 
asymmetric in favor of the relatively impatient country 2 (recall: δ1 > δ2). 
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Figure 6: The implementable set 
The implementable set can be transformed into the space of instantaneous 
social welfare which allows us to find the feasible set of negotiation. Figure 7 shows 
an example of the feasible set that corresponds to the implementable set shown in 
figure 6. 
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IC2τ(δ2) 
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Figure – 7: The feasible set 
In figure 7, ICiw(δi) is the locus in the payoff space as a pair of tariffs moves 
along ICiτ(δi) in figure 5. For any given δi ,  ICiw(δi) is backward bending due to the 
convexities of ICiτ(δi) and each indifference curve of country –i. For instance, the 
backward bending portion ab of IC2w(δ2) corresponds to the segment ab in figure 2. 
As δi increases, ICiτ(δi) in figure 5 shifts out, which decreases τi on ICiτ(δi) for any 
given τ-i. Thus IC1w(δ1) shifts up and IC2w(δ2) shifts to the right as δ1 and δ2 increase, 
respectively. The NN curve is the locus in the payoff space as a pair of tariffs moves 
along the axes in figure 5. The feasible set is the area surrounded by IC1w(δ1), 
IC2w(δ2) and the NN curve. It is tilted in favor of country 2 since δ1 > δ2 and expands 
as either δ1 or δ2 increases. 
450
N 
N (wN,wN) 
IC1w(δ1) 
IC2w(δ2) 
w1 
w2 
a 
b
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 From the feasible set the governments select a pair of tariff rates through 
negotiation. The solution concept adopted by Furusawa is the limit of the subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the Rubinstein bargaining model as the lag between offers 
converges to zero. Binmore (1987) shows this to be equivalent to the asymmetric 
Nash bargaining solution. Denoting the feasible set as X 2R⊂  and representing a 
disagreement point by ∈),( 21 ξξ X, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is given 
by argmax {(x1 -ξ1)θ (x2 - ξ2)1-θ}, with θ  =  r2 / (r1 + r2) being the discount rate of 
player i which can be treated as being player i’s “bargaining power”. Binmore (1987) 
suggests that the disagreement point in the Nash bargaining problem should be the 
status quo payoffs when the problem is interpreted as a limit problem of the 
Rubinstein bargaining model. This follows from the fact that in the Rubinstein 
model, a disagreement is made up of an infinite repetition of offers and rejections so 
that the status quo payoffs last forever. Applying Binmore’s result, Furusawa finds 
that the solution is characterized by the tangency between the Pareto-frontier and a 
level curve of the asymmetric Nash product (w1 - wN)θ (w2 - wN)1-θ, where wN = W(τN, 
τN). 
 For any given r1 and r2, the Pareto frontier consists of the NN curve and the 
backward bending portions of the incentive constraints if Δ is small enough. As Δ 
increases, both the incentive constraints shift in, which then makes the Pareto 
frontier consist only of the backward bending portions of ICiw(δi). If Δ is as high as 
δδ <≡− 22re , the Pareto frontier lies entirely above the 450 line. 
 Which country benefits more from the negotiation depends on the size of Δ. 
If Δ is very small, a large part of the Pareto frontier consists of the middle portion of 
 68  
the NN curve which Furusawa shows to be concave to the origin and symmetric with 
respect to the 450 line. This, combined with the fact that the slope of the level curve 
at any point (w1, w2), of the asymmetric Nash product (w1 - wN)θ (w2 - wN)1-θ, is 
steeper than that of the symmetric Nash product (w1 - wN)(w2 - wN) means that the 
solution lies in the lower portion of the NN curve. Thus the negotiation outcome 
favors country 1 more than country 2. If, on the other hand, Δ is very large, the 
Pareto frontier lies entirely above the 450 line. Consequently the negotiation outcome 
favors country 2 more than country 1. So for τ1 = τ2 = τN, we have the following 
proposition. 
 
Proposition 1 (Furusawa, 1999): For any r1 and r2, there exists a critical response 
lag Δ*(r1, r2) such that the two countries equally benefit from the negotiation, i.e. w1 
= w2, if the response lag equals  Δ*(r1, r2); country 1 benefits more than country 2, 
i.e., w1 > w2, if Δ < Δ*(r1, r2); and country 2 benefits more than country 1, i.e., w1 < 
w2, if Δ > Δ*(r1, r2). 
Proof: Please see Furusawa (1999). 
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3.2 Asymmetrical Tariffs and Country Size 
This baseline result using equal status quo tariff rates follows from the 
assumption that the 2 countries are of equal size. Relaxing the original assumption of 
equal size but retaining the assumption that government 1 is more patient (i.e. r1 < r2) 
leads to the following possibilities: 
 
A. Government 1 is more patient than government 2 and country 1 is bigger than 
country 2. 
B. Government 1 is more patient than government 2 but country 2 is bigger than 
country 1. 
 
The first possibility is described by the set of conditions r1 < r2 and 
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− μ
γ >
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− γ
μ , while the second possibility by 
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− μ
γ <
2/1
1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
− γ
μ . We 
note that expressing the status quo tariffs in terms of endowments allows us to view 
them as corresponding to country size.2 Thus, we can consider the cases where      
τ1N > τ2N and τ1N < τ2N such that the size of the tariff will indicate country size. This 
formulation allows us to assess the impact of differences in country size as well as 
status-quo tariffs. 
It can be inferred that under possibility A, country 1 is going to benefit even 
more than under the baseline model since the feasible set of negotiation is going to 
                                                 
2 For example if γ =0.7 and μ = 0.5 then [γ/(1-μ)]1/2  >  [μ/(1-γ)]1/2, please see Appendix 2 for a more 
detailed treatment. 
 70  
be asymmetrically skewed much greater in its favor. This follows from the fact that 
in the stage game, country 1 enjoys greater welfare from the outset. Figure 8 depicts 
this.  
 
Figure 8: The stage game when τ1N > τ2N 
 
The indifference curve depicting the welfare level of country 1 at the Nash 
equilibrium is much closer to the axis of its own tariff rate, indicating a much higher 
level of welfare. The corresponding diagram depicting the feasible set is drawn to 
reflect this.  
 
τ1N
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w2 = W(0,0) 
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0
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Figure – 9: The Feasible set when τ1N > τ2N 
 
It is possible to infer from figure 9 that country 1 may benefit to a much 
greater extent from the negotiation process than was possible when the two countries 
were of equal size. First, we note that the payoff space bounded by the locus NN is 
skewed in country 1’s favor, second, for country 2 to benefit from the negotiation, 
the solution, as described above, must occur to the left of the 450 line. For this to 
happen, the response lag Δ has to be sufficiently big. In contrast to the symmetrical 
case, however, the larger size of country 1 affords a cushion against the negative 
effects of greater Δ in the implementation phase since country 1 can credibly 
threaten to retaliate (by manipulating the terms of trade in its favor for example) 
should country 2, the impatient country, defect in an attempt to claim a larger share 
of the fruits of cooperation. On the other hand, if Δ is short, it can be expected that 
country 1 would benefit to a much greater extent during the negotiation phase. These 
observations are expressed in proposition 2. 
 w2 
w1    (wN,wN) 
 N 
N 
IC2w(δ2) 
IC1w(δ1) 450
 72  
Proposition 2: If country 1 is bigger as well as more patient than country 2, it 
suffers less from the negotiation outcome when Δ is large and benefits to a greater 
extent from the negotiation outcome when Δ is small, than would have been the case 
had the countries been of equal size.  
 
Next we turn our attention to the case where government 1 is more patient 
than government 2 but country 2 is bigger. The NN locus in figure 10 is drawn to 
reflect this.  
 
Figure –10 
 
We recall that patience strengthens bargaining power in the sense of 
Rubinstein (1982), but then again, greater patience may also negatively affect the 
government’s bargaining position through the shift in the implementable set in favor 
of the other country. This follows from the patient government being more willing to 
  w2 
w1 
N 
 N 450
IC1w(δ1) 
IC2w(δ2) 
  (wN,wN) 
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give its rival a relatively larger share of the fruits of tariff cooperation in order to 
keep the rival within the bounds of the cooperation framework during the 
implementation phase. 
As Furusawa demonstrates, if Δ is very small in the symmetrical case, the 
gain from defection is insignificant, so the incentive constraint is not binding for 
either government at the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. In this instance, only 
the first effect through explicit negotiation prevails, meaning that the negotiation 
outcome favors the more patient government. In the case where one country, in our 
case country 2, is bigger and the other country more patient (country 1) we postulate 
that this effect can be reversed. Country 2 can expect to gain from defection even if 
Δ is small since the smaller country cannot credibly retaliate (in the sense of Kennan 
and Riezman). In fact, in complete contrast to the symmetrical case, it is in the 
interest of government 1 to seek a settlement which keeps its own incentive 
constraint binding. This observation leads us to the following simple proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: Patience alone is not sufficient to overcome a disadvantage caused 
by smaller size.  
 
It is clear therefore that a tremendous advantage is afforded by country size. 
An advantage that cannot be negated either by means of greater patience or by means 
of early defection in the implementation phase. This means that a country that finds 
itself at a disadvantage in trade negotiations due to its smaller size must seek other 
ways to redress the imbalance. One way might be to “gang up’’ which might account 
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for the formation of trading blocs consisting of smaller nations – a point which is 
brought into relief when we consider the bargaining strength of say the EU versus a 
single European country in trade negotiations with the US. 
  
4 Concluding Remarks 
By combining the results of Kennan and Riezman (1988) within the overall 
framework of Furusawa’s basic model (1999) we examined the effect of country size 
on the negotiation of sustainable tariffs. We have confirmed the insight that large 
country size imparts a major advantage during the trade negotiation. Support for this 
insight can be found in the existing literature (Baier, 2001, Harrison et al., 1991, 
Dakhlia et al., 2004). Some extensions suggest themselves. It would be worthwhile 
to examine the dynamics of tariff negotiations when growth is incorporated in the 
model and empirical validation of the results set out in this paper are also desirable.  
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Appendix 1: The derivation of status quo tariffs in terms of endowments (Kennan 
and Riezman, 1988) 
There are two countries, A and B, two goods X and Y. Each country has many 
consumers with identical utility functions 
 
UA = XAYA UB = XBYB                                                                                          (1) 
 
where XA, YA, XB and YB denote consumption levels of each good in each country. 
The world endowment of each commodity is one unit. Country A has γ units 
of X and B has 1 – γ units; country B has µ units of Y and A has 1 – µ units. The 
endowments are divided equally between consumers within countries. In 
equilibrium, A exports X to B and imports Y from B. Country A charges a tariff at the 
rate S – 1 on imports of Y and B charges a tariff of T – 1 on imports of X. World 
prices are denoted by P and Q, so the domestic price of Y in A is SQ, and the price of 
X in B is TP. 
Consumers in A face prices P and SQ, and maximize UA subject to the budget 
constraint 
 
QYSSQPISQYPX AAA )1()1( −+−+==+ μγ                                                     (2) 
Utility is maximized by allocating equal expenditures to each good, so that  
)1()( YSSYXX AA +−===− μπγπ                                                                      (3) 
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where π is the world price ratio P/Q. When the budget constraint (2) is used to 
eliminate π from equation (3) the result is A’s offer curve: 
 
1)1( ++−= S
Y
S
X
μγ                                                                                                  (4) 
 
Given any tariffs S and T, A’s offer curve (4) and the analogous equation for 
B are linear in the reciprocals of imports and exports, so they can be solved to obtain 
the market clearing consumption levels. Thus 
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TXX A
/)1(1
)1(
μμ
μγγ +−+
−+=−=                                                                              (5) 
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STT
TYY A
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Then A’s utility level is 
 
])1(][/)1(1[
])1([ 2
γγμμ
μγ
+−++−+
−+==
STTST
TYXU AAA                                             (6) 
 
The optimal tariff problem for A is to choose a tariff which maximizes the 
utility of the representative consumer at the market clearing levels of XA and YA. 
From (6), the first order condition for this problem is  
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This can be written as a quadratic equation in S which (implicitly) defines A’s tariff 
reaction function. The reaction function for the two countries can be solved to obtain 
the Nash equilibrium tariffs as functions of the endowments: 
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Appendix 2: Tariff size and utilities. 
 
Let, 
2/1
1 1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= μ
γτ N = a          and         
2/1
2 1 ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
−= γ
μτ N = b 
 
Then,  )1(2 μγ −=a  and )1(2 γμ −=b which allows us to express μ and γ in terms of 
a2 and b2 hence, 
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The Nash equilibrium utility level for A can then be found by substituting for the 
tariffs in equation (6) of appendix 1. This yields: 
 
1
)1(2/1
−
−=
ab
baU ANash                                                                                                      (8) 
 
The utility level of A at free trade can be found by setting S = T = 1 in equation (6) 
which gives us 
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A will then gain from a tariff war if A TradeFree
A
Nash UU >  i.e. if 
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Interchanging a and b gives the condition for B to win a tariff war. 
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 We can obtain a graphical expression of (10) in terms of the endowment 
parameters γ and μ by appropriately replacing a and b and simplifying to obtain the 
equivalent condition 
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                                Figure 11                                                     Figure 12 
 
 Figure 11 shows the implicit plot of (11). We note that at (0.4,0.6) the 
function is bifurcated. That is because when μ = 0.4 and γ = 0.6 the Nash equilibrium 
tariffs of both countries are the same and equal to 1, so there is no tariff “war” as 
such. Thus, there is a range of values for which the inequality (10) does not strictly 
hold. A would win the tariff war if the endowments were such that (10) strictly held. 
  
μ 
γ 
μ 
γ 
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Figure 12 shows the case where B wins the tariff war (inequality (10) with a and b 
interchanged).  
As we confine our analysis to the cases where (10) holds we can interpret this  
condition intuitively (as do Kennan and Riezman) by looking at the following 
diagram (figure 13) which is constructed by superimposing the figures 11 and 12. 
 
 
Figure 13 
 Any point in the southeast region of the diagram gives an endowment that 
will result in country A winning a tariff war while any endowment in the northeast 
region of the diagram will lead to country B winning the war. If the endowment 
vector falls within the shaded area no country wins a tariff war. 
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The use of some New Measures of Outward Orientation 
to assess the relationship between 
Openness and Country Size 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
Two new measures of openness, namely the Trade Restrictiveness Index and the 
Mercantile Trade Restrictiveness Index are used to empirically examine the 
relationship between a country’s size and outward orientation. We find that the 
inverse relationship between country size and openness which is reported in the 
literature holds when these two measures are employed.   
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1 Introduction 
A recent body of economic literature deals with the determinants of trade 
openness and identifies country size as being a pertinent variable (Ades et al., 1994; 
Wacziarg, 1997; Alesina et al., 1997, 1998). Specifically, the relationship between 
the two is an inverse one, smaller countries are more likely to be open to trade than 
larger ones. The intuition behind this relationship is aptly summarized by Alesina et 
al. (1998) who posits that in the absence of international trade markets are identified 
by political boundaries which results in countries facing economic incentives to be 
large. If, on the other hand, a country is able to trade with the rest of the world, 
political boundaries prove less of a constraint on market size. Consequently, as the 
international trade regime becomes more and more liberal, various ethnic groups or 
regions find it both feasible as well as less costly to separate. Since smaller countries 
need to trade in order to be economically viable, support for the liberal trade regime 
will intensify. Essentially, small countries need to trade in order to enjoy the benefits 
of access to a bigger market. One can therefore expect smaller nations to be more 
open to trade than their larger counterparts. Alesina et al. (1998) find empirical 
evidence to support this conjecture. 
In their paper Alesina et al. (1998) use the share of imports and exports over 
GDP as their principle measure of openness and regress it on measures of country 
size and other controls.1 Given the difficulties associated with this measure (and 
other traditional measures) we employ some new measures of openness recently 
                                                 
1 Other measures of outward orientation such as average tariff rates were also used and the qualitative 
findings were reported; however the actual regression results were not. 
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developed by Anderson and Neary (1994, 1996, 2003; hereinafter AN) to see if the 
results of Alesina et al. hold. We find that our results do in fact agree with the spirit 
of their findings. 
 Section 2 is a theoretical discussion of the pitfalls of traditional measures of 
trade openness and a description of the new measures introduced by Anderson et al. 
Section 3 describes the regression results, section 4 discusses some limitations of the 
new measures while section 5 concludes. 
 
2 The measurement of trade openness – traditional and 
new indices  
 The crudest measure of protection, which is sometimes computed when data 
is lacking, is the simple (un-weighted) average of tariff rates across different 
commodities. Obviously this measure is disadvantaged by the fact that it ignores the 
relative importance of a traded good i.e. it treats all commodities identically and is 
sensitive to changes in the classification of goods in the tariff schedule. A better 
measure would then be one that incorporates a weighting scheme for tariffs 
reflecting the relative importance of imported goods. 
 A commonly used improved measure that is employed by researchers to 
quantify the level of protection in an economy is the trade-weighted average tariff 
which uses actual trade volumes as weights. 
∑=
i
ii
w m
m
ττ 1                                                                                                       (1) 
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where mi is the import of good i, τi is the tariff levied on good i, and m is the level of 
total imports. This measure is unsatisfactory because it suffers from the classic index 
number problem – as the tariff on any good i is increased, the import volume of that 
good decreases which leads to a commensurate decline in the weight associated with 
the good. If tariffs are high enough, the decline in the weight may be so large that the 
index is decreasing in the tariff rate. In the extreme case, if tariffs are prohibitively 
high, the associated weights fall to zero and the tariffs no longer contribute to the 
index. It is also to be noted that tariffs have pronounced effects on both welfare and 
trade volume when they are levied upon imports that have a relatively elastic 
demand, yet it is exactly these goods whose weights decrease most rapidly. 
A way around this problem may be to abandon the use of current import 
volumes altogether and instead use the import volumes that would prevail under free 
trade (Leamer, 1974). While this allows us to avoid the downward bias associated 
with the trade weighted index we are still left with the practical problem of obtaining 
free trade import volumes which are not directly observable. 
Other measures of trade restrictiveness have been no less unsatisfactory. 
Some researchers (notably Alesina et al. (1998) as mentioned above) have used the 
ratio of total trade volume (imports plus exports) to GDP as a measure of openness. 
This measure is unconvincing for two reasons, first is the very plausible possibility 
that the equilibrium ratio of total trade to GDP may be low for a particular economy 
in free trade; second, within the context of its relationship to country size, the two 
variables may ‘cause’ each other (as is indeed noted by Alesina et al. (1998)). 
Leamer (1987) developed a measure of trade openness based on an empirical 
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Heckscher – Ohlin (H-O) trade model where protectionism is evidenced by non 
conformity to the predictions of the model. Unfortunately, the H-O model may not 
adequately describe the patterns of trade in the latter half of the 20th century.  
Given the aforementioned problems associated with the traditionally used 
indices recent attempts have been made to create universal tariff measures that are 
grounded in economic theory rather than relying on ad-hoc weighting schemes. The 
seminal contributions in this regard are by Anderson and Neary (AN) with their 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI, 1996) and Mercantilist Trade Restrictiveness 
Index (MTRI, 2003). We briefly discuss these measures below. 
 
2.1 The Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) 
 
The TRI is superior to the traditional indices described above in that it is 
based on sound analytical foundations. It is defined as the uniform tariff equivalent 
(UTE) which has the same static welfare effect as the existing structure of ad-
valorem tariffs. If we consider the standard partial equilibrium analysis of the effects 
of a tariff on a small open economy (figure 1), the quota equivalent of a tariff τ is 
AB, in other words it is the quota that produces the same static welfare loss (as 
indicated by the shaded Marshallian triangles) as the tariff (O’Rourke, 1997). The 
TRI is simply the uniform tariff which would have exactly the same static welfare 
effect as the structure of tariffs and quotas actually in place. It is a weighted average 
tariff but instead of trade shares there are now marginal welfare weights. 
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Figure 1: Effect of a Tariff on a Small Open Economy   
More formally the problem is to find u such that 
 
V(τ1, …,τi, …) = V(u, …, u, …)                                                                                 (2) 
 
where (τ1, …,τi, …) is the system of ad-valorem tariffs and V is the representative 
consumer’s indirect utility function. The UTE is thus a more theoretically exact tariff 
aggregator since it is derived from utility considerations. In practice, derivation of 
the index requires us to explicitly model the economy in a general equilibrium (GE) 
framework. A computable general equilibrium (CGE) model must be specified and 
calibrated using available data and various assumptions regarding preferences and 
technology. To shed more light on this issue we provide a brief exposition based on 
AN (2003). 
Demand 
Supply 
    p 
  p(1+τ) 
Price 
Quantity 
A                  B 
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 A general model of a tariff-distorted open economy is developed by first 
assuming a single representative consumer, the economy in competitive equilibrium, 
no distortions other than tariffs and the price of traded goods being fixed in the world 
markets.  
 The trade expenditure function E(π, u) describes private sector behavior. This 
represents the expenditure needed to attain utility level u facing a price vector π of 
traded goods subject to tariffs net of income received from ownership of the factors 
of production. Spending and income are represented by the expenditure and GDP 
functions respectively 
 
)(),(),( πππ gueuE −=                                                                                          (3) 
 
Factor endowments, prices of non-traded goods, factor prices and prices of traded 
goods not subject to tariffs are in the background and have been suppressed2. The 
price derivative of the trade expenditure function is the economy’s general 
equilibrium utility-compensated (i.e. Hicksian) import demand function 
 
),(),( umuE c πππ =                                                                                                (4) 
 
 Public and private sector behavior is summarized by the balance of trade 
function 
 
                                                 
2 Factor prices and the price of non-traded goods are endogenous given π and u.  
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),(*)(),(),( uEuEuB πππππ π⋅−−≡                                                                    (5) 
 
where the last term on the right hand side is the inner product of tariff wedge (π – π*) 
between domestic and world prices (denoted by a *) and the import demand 
function. The expression is equivalent to tariff revenue. The economy is in 
equilibrium when the balance of trade constraint is satisfied. This requires that utility 
be at a level that equates (5) to any exogenous income b 
 
buB =),(π                                                                                                                   (6) 
 
The balance of trade function (6) summarizes the equilibrium of an economy subject 
to tariffs in a single equation. This is the basis on which AN (1996) introduce the 
TRI as implying the uniform tariff rate τΔ implicitly defined as follows 
 
00 ]*,)1[(: buB =+ ΔΔ πττ                                                                                          (7) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
where u0 and b0 are some initial levels of utility and income respectively. The value 
of τΔ is the uniform tariff which would ensure balance of payments equilibrium at the 
initial level of utility. 3 
 
 
                                                 
3 Δ itself is defined as the factor of proportionality by which period 1 prices must be deflated to ensure 
that equilibrium prevails when utility is at its period 0 level. In AN 1996 this is equal to the inverse of 
one plus the uniform tariff equivalent which would yield the same level of welfare as the initial policy 
instruments. Since Δ is a deflator, it is a compensating variation type of measure, an increase in Δ 
corresponds to an increase in trade restrictiveness. 
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2.2 The Mercantilist TRI (MTRI) 
 
 The TRI evaluated the restrictiveness of trade policy using welfare as the 
benchmark. The MTRI on the other hand employs the initial import volume as the 
reference point. 
 The starting point of the MTRI is the import volume function M(π, b) which 
is the volume of imports evaluated at world prices when the vector of domestic 
prices of the distorted traded goods is equal to π and the trade balance is equal to b 
 
),(*),( uEbM πππ π⋅=                                                                                          (8) 
 
where the level of u is compatible with balanced trade (i.e. (6)). Then the MTRI 
gives the uniform tariff τμ which yields the same volume (at world prices) of tariff 
restricted imports as the initial tariffs, M 0 
 
00 ]*,)1[(: MbM =+ πττ μμ                                                                                  (9) 
 
The TRI and MTRI both represent theoretically based indices. Consequently 
they avoid the biases associated with more traditional tariff weight based indices. 
They are based on optimizing behavior and are constructed within the framework of 
GE models of the economy.  Whereas the TRI is derived from welfare 
considerations, the MTRI uses trade volume as its point of reference. It is worth 
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reiterating once again that both the TRI and MTRI are indices that compare the 
actual tariff structure with those of free trade. AN (2003) provide a comparative 
theoretical discussion of the two indices.4 They compute these two indices for a 
cross-country sample of 25 nations and also provide the weighted average tariff rates 
(Tariff) for the same sample. We utilize this data set to explore the relationship 
between country size and trade restrictiveness   
 
3         Openness and Country Size 
  In order to assess the relationship between openness and country size, 
we regress a set of openness indices against country size principally measured by the 
log of population. To the cross-section data of TRI and MTRI for 25 countries 
compiled by AN we add some more measures of openness which are described fully 
below. We also include the log of area and log of per capita GDP as well as a series 
of dummy variables corresponding to a country’s status as an oil exporter, 
geographical location or membership of the OECD. The estimated ‘openness’ 
equation is inspired by Alesina et al. (1998) and assumes the following form 
 
εβββ
ββββββ
++++
+++++=
584736
25143210
DDD
DDAreaDPPerCapitaGPopulationOM
       (10) 
 
                                                 
4 Among the theoretical issues discussed are the conditions under which the MTRI exceeds the trade 
weighted average tariff and the fact that the MTRI can never exceed the TRI. 
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where OM = Openness Measure, D1 = Oil Exporter Dummy, D2 = Africa Dummy, 
D3 = South and S.E. Asia Dummy, D4 = OECD Dummy and D5 = Latin America 
Dummy. (D1 = 1 if Oil Exporter 0 otherwise etc.) 
            The openness measures chosen include TRI and MTRI described above along 
with three others, namely the percentage of exports as a percentage of GDP (XGDP), 
import duties as a percentage of total imports (Import) and average weighted tariffs 
(Tariff)5. Due to the problems of causality mentioned on page 86 we drop the use of 
the ratio of total trade (exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) as a measure of 
openness for the present analysis. XGDP is essentially trade intensity measure while 
Tariff and Import are measures of trade restriction like the TRI and MTRI. 
            Table 1 lists all raw data and Table 2 shows the matrix of correlations for the 
various measures of openness. We see that the restriction based indicators TRI, 
MTRI, Tariff and Import are positively correlated. We also note that the relationship 
between the restriction based measures and XGDP is weakly correlated. 
             These observations are mirrored in Figure 1 where the cross-country results 
are plotted. One notes the especially close relationship between MTRI and Tariff 
(correlation coefficient of 0.98726). However, AN (2003) caution us that the two 
measures should not be used interchangeably for different countries because even-
though Tariff under-predicts MTRI in 22 out of the 25 cases only slightly (8.9% on 
average), the under-prediction exceeds 15% for 4 countries (Austria, Indonesia, 
Morocco and the USA) and Tariff actually over-predicts MTRI by about 7% for 
India. Furthermore, the TRI consistently exceeds the MTRI which is in line with the 
theoretical prediction of AN in their paper. 
                                                 
5 Tariff as an openness measure can also be found in Yannikaya (2003) 
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Table – 2 
Correlation Matrix for the various openness indicators. 
 XGDP Tariff TRI MTRI Import 
XGDP 1.0000     
Tariff -0.0843    1.0000    
TRI 0.1041   0.8626 1.0000   
MTRI -0.0555   0.9873   0.8861  1.0000  
Import 0.2044    0.1233    0.2661   0.0590    1.0000 
 
Since the TRI, MTRI, Tariff and Import are all trade restriction measures we 
can carry out tests of hypothesis of equal means. The results of such tests are shown 
in Table 3 below. 
Table – 3 
Tests for Equality of Means 
Null Hypothesis Computed t score Decision (α = 0.05) 
μTRI  = μMTRI 2.699 Reject Null 
μTRI  = μImport 3.484 Reject Null 
μTRI = µTariff 3.189 Reject Null 
μMTRI = μImport 1.181 Do not reject Null 
µMTRI = μTariff 0.557 Do not reject Null 
µImport = μTariff -0.711 Do not reject Null 
 
  Table 4 represents the regression results (t – ratios in parenthesis). Alesina et 
al. report that country size (as measured by population) and openness are negatively 
related when openness is measured as the ratio of total trade to GDP, our regression 
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results mirrors this aspect; they also report that tariff rates are positively related to 
country size and our results also agree. In fact, it is striking to note that while the 
trade intensity measure XGDP is negatively related to country size the restrictiveness 
measures (Tariff, TRI, MTRI and Import) are all positively related. However, only 
the Logs of Population, Per Capita GDP and Area are statistically significant at the 
10% level when the employed dependant variable is XGDP. 
Table – 4 
Regression Results 
Dependant Variable XGDP Tariff TRI MTRI Import 
Constant 60.999 
(1.489) 
2.177 
(0.090) 
 
-3.893 
(-0.136) 
-1.810 
(-0.069) 
34.001 
(1.089) 
Log Population -4.678 
(-1.953) 
0.687 
(0.484) 
 
1.678 
(1.006) 
0.959 
(0.630) 
1.020 
(0.563) 
Log Per Capita GDP 8.571 
(1.911) 
1.044 
(0.393) 
 
2.533 
(0.811) 
1.655 
(0.580) 
-2.592 
(-0.765) 
Log Area -3.826 
(-1.768) 
-0.310 
(-0.242) 
 
-1.395 
(-0.925) 
-0.587 
(-0.427) 
-0.844 
(-0.516) 
Oil Exporter Dummy 3.809 
(0.824) 
-1.588 
(-0.580) 
 
-0.935 
(-0.290) 
-0.933 
(-0.317) 
-1.744 
(-0.499) 
Africa Dummy -7.625 
(-0.691) 
-5.111 
(-0.782) 
 
2.630 
(0.342) 
-3.821 
(-0.545) 
7.069 
(0.848) 
South and S. East Asia 
Dummy 
12.337 
(1.250) 
3.573 
(0.612) 
14.911 
(2.168) 
4.325 
(0.689) 
3.798 
(0.509) 
 
OECD Dummy 
 
-20.855 
(-1.847) 
 
-6.283 
(-0.940) 
 
 
-4.685 
(-0.596) 
 
-6.409 
(-0.893) 
 
-0.962 
(-0.113) 
Latin America Dummy -14.602 
(-1.412) 
-1.058 
(-0.173) 
1.495 
(0.207) 
-0.486 
(-0.74) 
-1.356 
(-0.173) 
 
Adjusted R2 
 
0.631 
 
0.154 
 
0.485 
 
0.118 
 
0.185 
 
In other words the larger a country, the lower is its trade intensity i.e. lower is 
the proportion of it’s GDP that is determined by ‘interaction’ with the outside world 
 96  
and the larger a country, the higher it’s ‘restrictiveness’ to external trade. Either way, 
the conclusion is the same. Smaller countries are more open to trade than their larger 
counterparts. Our observations appear to agree with the findings of the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature. At the very least, the spirit of the findings of 
Alesina et al. (1998) seems to be robust to the definition of openness used.  
  
4  The TRI and MTRI – Some Limitations. 
 
The TRI and its extension the MTRI introduced in a series of papers by AN 
represent the most theoretically sound measures of protection (openness) available to 
researchers. In practice both are computed by calibrating a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model of the economy the details of which are omitted here. 
Suffice to say that AN’s CGE model is tractable and robust to changes in the 
elasticities which are embedded in it. Nonetheless, the TRI, in particular, has 
received some criticism, notably by O’Rourke (1997) who argues that while the 
index is indeed robust to changes in elasticities it can be sensitive to changes in the 
specification of the underlying CGE model and provides a historical example to 
illustrate his point. One should thus be cognizant that in practice, the index number 
problem is essentially replaced by a question over the correct specification of the 
CGE model i.e. the appropriate elasticities of substitution in preferences and 
technology. 
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More seriously, Dakhilia and Temimi (DT, 2004) cast doubt over the 
existence and uniqueness of the TRI when countries involved are large8. We recall 
that the TRI (and MTRI) is an index that compares the actual tariff structure with 
that in free trade (section 2), in other words, the TRI is calculated on the basis of self 
inflicted losses that come about as a result of deviation from the free trade ideal. 
Herein lies the problem. DT (2004) argue that for large countries the optimal tariff 
may be non-zero. While tariffs do restrict trade, they may not necessarily be 
detrimental to the welfare of a large country especially if it has a big economy where 
other forms of taxes such as sales taxes are either impractical or ineffective and 
tariffs represent the best option for raising revenue. Furthermore, a positive level of 
tariffs can improve the terms of trade and, of course, there may exist lobbying groups 
representing special interests. These being the case, DT contend that for a large 
country, the appropriate benchmark to measure the cost of protectionism is deviation 
from the welfare-maximizing tariff structure and not the vector of zero tariffs.  
They suggest an extension of the TRI to large economies, namely the 
Uniform Tariff Deviation Equivalent (UTDE), an index which continues to maintain 
the essence of the TRI in that it is a measure of protection which is a function of the 
welfare cost relative to a welfare optimum, where the optimum is no longer free 
trade but a welfare-maximizing tariff vector.  
In light of the limitations described above, the use of the TRI as a measure of 
protection and the interpretation of any analytical or empirical results obtained 
thereof has to be conducted with caution. 
                                                 
8 Please see the appendix for an elaboration of this point.  
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Table 1 
Raw Data 
Country TARIFF XGDP TRI MTRI IMPORT POP PGDP AREA 
Argentina 14.9 6.598187 19.6 15.3 9.11 33400.41 8808.67 2766890 
Australia 10.8 18.04171 16.6 11.6 5.1 17489 20165.06 7686850 
Austria 10.6 37.60335 20 12.4 1.09 7913.8 20431.42 83870 
Bolivia 9.4 20.04576 9.3 9.3 5.73 6897 2447.57 1098580 
Brazil 16.1 10.86825 23.3 17.6 8.83 152680 6104.5 8511965 
Canada 7.0 27.35862 9.5 7.9 2.44 28376.5 21195.1 9984670 
Colombia 10 17.70846 12.4 10.9 11.44 36363.42 4955.32 1138910 
Ecuador 6.5 36.02702 9.5 6.9 9.9 10735.02 3821.63 283560 
Finland 6.0 26.20618 12.6 5.9 0.75 5042 17693.5 337030 
Hungary 9.1 31.445 15.3 10.3 9.97 10324 8250.68 93030 
India 16.2 8.994515 31.6 15.1 30.74 882300 1723.68 3287590 
Indonesia 12.8 27.89144 30.4 16.2 3.79 184556.2 3169.43 1919440 
Malaysia 9.7 75.98386 21.0 10.2 21.67 19127.1 6963.64 329750 
Mexico 10.8 15.23779 12.4 11.4 4.29 86238 7616.05 1972550 
Morocco 7.1 25.07515 18.5 9.7 16.89 24999.43 3506.31 446550 
New Zealand 7.9 31.4844 13.6 9.1 4.05 3514 15206.32 268680 
Norway 4.5 37.97216 8.4 4.6 17.02 4286 21389.65 324220 
Paraguay 12.5 28.07129 17.8 13.2 5.53 4470.35 5050.62 406750 
Peru 15.8 12.51906 16.0 15.8 11.86 22369.07 3646.15 1285220 
Philippines 14.2 29.12975 17.3 14.6 14.02 65559.68 2880.58 300000 
Poland 8.7 23.70006 14.5 9.8 13.6 38364.7 6221.99 312685 
Thailand 32 36.97248 44.7 34.4 8.66 57343.26 5459.93 514000 
Tunisia 9.9 39.5348 18.6 10.4 20.36 8514.7 5196.97 163610 
USA 4.0 10.18557 6.1 4.8 2.78 255403 26460.18 9631418 
Venezuela 12.9 26.35527 21.1 14.5 7.3 20441 7137.19 912050 
Sources: AN (2003), Yanikkaya (2003), World Bank (devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline), CIA world fact-book (cia.gov) 
Population (POP): ‘000 (1992), Per Capita GDP (PGDP): constant 1995 US$, Area: sq. km., Distance to Equator: km. 
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Figure – 1 
Trade Openness Measures (%)
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Sources: AN (2003), Yanikkaya (2003) 
Note:  Import data represents the average for the 1990s, XGDP data correspond to the year 1992. For Tariff, TRI and MTRI, data from the following years are available: 
1984 – Morocco 
1988 – Norway, Finland, New Zealand, Malaysia, Austria, Australia, Thailand,  
1989 – Poland, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil 
1990 – USA, Canada, Paraguay,  
1991 – Ecuador, Hungary, Bolivia, Tunisia, Colombia, Venezuela, Philippines, Peru, India,  
1992 – Argentina   
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5.  Concluding Remarks 
 This paper employed some new and traditional measures of trade 
restrictiveness to asses the relationship between country size and openness. We 
found that the inverse relationship between openness and country size as reported in 
Alesina et. al (1998) holds true for the cross country sample of 25 nations 
considered. Despite the limitations of the TRI and MTRI discussed in section 4, they 
remain the best theoretical indices of protectionism so far.  Future research along 
these lines will make use of a larger and much more comprehensive data set that not 
only incorporates many more countries but also panel data across time. It would be 
interesting to repeat this exercise using the UTDE measure proposed by DT (2004). 
However, we do not expect the qualitative results to change. 
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Appendix: The non-existence and non-uniqueness of the TRI when countries are 
large. 
 Dhaklia and Temimi (DT, 2004) have cast doubt upon the existence and 
uniqueness of the TRI especially when countries are large. We recall that the 
construction of the TRI requires us to find the Uniform Tariff Equivalent (UTE) – 
the ad-valorem tariff rate that when applied to all imports yields the same welfare 
loss as the actual system of ad-valorem tariffs. The UTE is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The UTE 
 Figure 2 shows a country’s welfare level curves with respect to ad-valorem 
tariff rates on two goods. If the actual tariff structure is represented by point A, then 
point B represents the uniform tariff rate vector with the same negative welfare 
effect. 
 DT contend that the above mentioned approach must necessarily assume that 
the country in question is small. A large country may have a non-zero optimal tariff 
and the welfare effects would then no longer be monotonic over the set of positive 
tariffs. Consequently if the small country assumption is dropped, the UTE would 
450 A 
B 
Tariff 1 
   Tariff 2 
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either not exist or would assume multiple values. The intuition behind this idea is 
illustrated as follows. 
 
Figure 3: The non-existence or multiplicity of a UTE 
 
 In the large country case, let the welfare-maximizing tariff vector, 
represented by point A, be in the positive orthant and the iso-welfare curves be 
concentric around this optimum (for purposes of exposition it is assumed that the iso-
welfare curves are well behaved and point A is the only local welfare maximum, in 
other words the construction is free of “pathologies”). Three possible cases emerge. 
 First, if the actual tariff vector is given by point B, located on an iso-welfare 
curve that does not intersect the 45 degree line, a UTE does not exist. 
 Second, if the actual tariff is given by point C, located on an iso-welfare 
curve that intersects the 45 degree line at points D and E, multiple UTEs exist. 
 Third, if the actual tariff is given by point F, then the UTE will be at point G. 
This however seems to be coincidental. 
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 The source of the problem, once again, is that the welfare of a large country 
is not monotonic in uniform tariffs. SD suggest an alternative measure of protection, 
namely the Uniform Tariff Deviation Equivalent (UTDE) wherein the benchmark 
used to measure the cost of protection is no longer (deviation from) free trade (as is 
the case for the TRI and MTRI) but some welfare maximizing tariff vector.   
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